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                                                              Abstract 
 
India is about to enter a new technological phase as far as mobile technology is concerned. After 
almost a decade of existence, Third Generation (3G) mobile technology will be rolled out in 
India. The licenses for the same were auctioned in April – May 2010 and 3G licenses were 
allocated to the winners in September 2010. Nine private telecom operators entered the bidding 
for the license and eventually seven won the licenses. The bidding was intense and eventually the 
aggregate fees of the license as received by the government were almost twice the expected 
amount. In the backdrop of experience of 3G auction winners in UK and Germany who paid huge 
sums to acquire the 3G licenses and later lost their market capitalization as the markets perceived 
that the price paid for the license was more than the actual value of the license, analysts in India 
were concerned if the operators had paid too much for the licenses. In this report aggregate value 
of the 3G licenses is calculated using both traditional discounted cash flow approach and real 
options approach. We find that the rollout of 3G services gives an internal rate of return of 
14.2%over the life of the license. If we assume an internal rate of return of 15% for the telecom 
operators then the aggregate license value comes out to be INR 594 Billion which is 12% lower 
than what the operators have paid to acquire the license. We also found out that the value of the 
license as calculated from the real options methodology is INR 798 Billion which is 17.8% higher 
than the aggregate value paid by the operators. Hence we see that DCF valuation suggests that the 
licenses were overvalued while Real Options methodology suggests that the licenses were 
undervalued.  
The report discusses the reasons for differences between real option valuation and DCF valuation 
of the license, the possible challenges that the 3Goperators might face in the short to long term 
and what are the key enablers for the growth of3G services if they want to extract the maximum 
mileage out of the 3G technology. The report recommends that in future while allocating telecom 
licenses or licenses in sectors where high and irreversible investment is required and there is a 
scope for the licensees to invest in phases or in modules, the government should consider real 
options methodology for setting the price of the license., or the base price of the licenses in case 
the government decides to follow an auction methodology.  
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1 Introduction 
India is the 2
nd
 largest telecom market in the world and operators had bid aggressively for the 
3G spectrum license primarily to shore up the fall in the ARPU and improve their profit 
margins. India is divided into 23 telecom circles. Though the overall Teledensity is around 
60%, Teledensity in some of the Metro and Category „A‟ circles is above 100%. Telecom 
operators in this fast growth environment are suffering from hyper competition and addition 
of prepaid subscribers because of which ARPU has fallen from INR 272 in Mar‟ 07 to 120 in 
Mar‟10. In India ~95% of the subscribers are prepaid subscribers. 
Analysts were worried if winners‟ curse would hit Indian 3G auction winners and whether the 
winners of the auction would actually end up paying more than the true value of the license. 
Some analysts believe that winners‟ curse hit the auction winners in UK and Germany. UK 
and Germany auction generated USD 35 Billion and USD 46 Billion
1
respectively which were 
much more than the amount initially expected. 
The motivation to undertake this piece of research was the overwhelming 3G spectrum 
license fees as discovered during the 3G spectrum license auction last year. 3G license 
auction in India ran for almost 34 days and after 183 rounds of bidding 9 telecom operators 
shelled out INR 67718.95 crore. The auction started on 9
th
 April 2010 and concluded on 20
th
 
May 2010. Out of this amount INR 50968.37 was shelled out by 7 private operators while 
INR 16750.58 was shelled out by the state owned operators namely BSNL & MTNL
2
.The 
windfall received by government in the form of auction amount was almost twice the amount 
as expected by the government. The reserve price of the pan-India 3G spectrum as discovered 
during the auction (INR 16750 crore) was almost 5 times its reserve price (INR 3500 crore) 
as set by the government before the start of the auction
3
.While many news articles claimed 
that price of the 3G license as paid by the operators was above its intrinsic value, there was 
areport in The Economic Times which claimedthat there could be a business case for some of 
the 3G operators despite the high license fees
4
. 
                                                 
1
www.pensions-research.org/3G.pdf, accessed on 10-03-2011 
2
http://www.medianama.com/2010/05/223-3g-auction-india-ends-provisional-winners, accessed on 10-03-2011 
3
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-28/india-business/28196801_1_reserve-price-bwa-
spectrum-pricing, accessed on 10-03-2011 
4
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2009-08-28/india-business/28196801_1_reserve-price-bwa-
spectrum-pricing, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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Before discussing the intricacies of the auctions, I would now like to discuss about the 
relevance of 3G in Emerging Markets, 3G Auctions worldwide, 3G Auctions in India and 
Value of 3G from an Indian Perspective. In the 2
nd
 chapter I would discuss about the 
historical evolution of the mobile technology, and the migration path of previous and 
futuristic wireless technologies.  
1.1 3G in Emerging Markets 
There is a stark difference in mobile Teledensity between developing and developed nations. 
The following graphic in Figure 1 represents the same, 
 
Figure 1 – Cellular Teledensity in Developed & Developing Countries 
Source: Worldbank 
 The major factors which affect the growth of the mobile telephony are lower incomes which 
give rise to small tax collection and hence lower expenditure by government in providing the 
enabling infrastructure. As we discussed earlier there is an established correlation between 
growth of mobile and broadband services and the income of a nation. To provide boost to the 
growth of telecommunications in emerging markets, various governments establish funds to 
create a service infrastructure where it is really needed. Some of the measures that 
governments take are subsidizing the license fees, creating public sector telecom entities, 
reduction of duties etc. They may also adopt policies like Calling Party Pays and reduce the 
financial burden on lower income subscribers
5
.The graphics below in Figure 2 demonstrate 
the 2008 values of GNI per Capita and Mobile Cellular Teledensity, 
                                                 
5
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4G, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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Figure 2 – Comparison of GNI & Teledensity of Developed & Developing Nations 
Source: Worldbank 
The figure gives a gross picture of how Mobile Teledensity affects GNI. A similar 
relationship is seen between Internet Penetration and GNI per Capita. Hence communications 
infrastructure provides an economic stimulus to a country‟s economy. Globally the capital 
cost of providing mobile coverage per subscriber is one-tenth of that of capital cost required 
for providing wireline coverage.  Developing countries are prone to theft and vandalism of 
public properties because of low income levels and unstable economic and political 
environment. Due to this reason wireless technology is advantageous as the infrastructure is 
less prone to theft and vandalism as compared to wireline infrastructure. Moreover wireless 
infrastructure could be laid quickly as compared to wireline infrastructure and is scalable 
too.Till October ‟07 there were more than 44.2 crore CDMA2000 deployments across the 
globe. Majority of these deployments were in developing markets
6
.  
“Popularized not only by their much greater voice/data capacities and air link, 3G wireless 
technologies like EV-DO Rel. 0, EV-DO Rev. A, UMTS and HSPA have also become 
preferred solutions given their excellent coverage, outstanding mobility attributes (the end 
game for most wireless WAN deployments), availability in numerous spectrum bands (such as 
450 MHz, 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1.8 GHz, 1.9 GHz, 2.1 GHz, 2.5 GHz, etc.) and 
interoperability with prior and future network evolutions”(Kumar, Liu, Sengupta, & Divya, 
2010). 
                                                 
6
www.qualcomm.com/documents/files/3g-emerging-markets.pdf, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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1.2 3G Auctions Worldwide 
3G spectrum is a scarce natural resource and hence countries across the world have adopted 
various methods to allocate this piece of resource to various utility companies. Some of the 
methods are, 
1.2.1 Auction 
In auction bidders are invited to place their bids in a competitive setting and then the 
spectrum is allocated to the bidder who places the highest bid. There could be multiple 
rounds in competitive bidding scenario. 
1.2.2 Assignment 
In case of Assignment mechanism government or the central agency that is in charge of 
allocating the spectrum assigns the spectrum to various applicants without any fees. 
1.2.3 Beauty Contest 
In case of beauty contest spectrum is assigned to various applicants on the basis of certain 
preconditions and criteria for allotment of spectrum. A spectrum fees is charged from the 
operators to whom spectrum is assigned. 
3G services have been rolled out in more than 100 countries throughout the worlds. Table 1 – 
Snapshot of 3G Auctions in other nationsTable 1 gives a snapshot of some of the countries 
where 3G spectrum has been allotted to various operators, 
Table 1 – Snapshot of 3G Auctions in other nations 
Country  Date of Allocation Method
#
 No. of 3G 
Licenses 
License Fee 
Per Capita (US$) 
License 
Fee/GDP 
Europe           
Spain Mar-00 BC 4 11.8 0.08% 
UK Apr-00 A 5 576.5 2.34% 
Netherlands Jul-00 A 5 156.5 0.65% 
Germany Aug-00 A 6 561.7 2.43% 
Italy Oct-00 A 5 193.6 1.01% 
Austria Nov-00 A 6 76.2 0.31% 
Norway Nov-00 BC 4 10 0.03% 
Switzerland Dec-00 A 4 16.1 0.05% 
France Jul 2001+Dec 2001 BC 3 318 1.29% 
Asia           
Japan Oct 2001-Dec 2002 Assignment 3 0 0% 
Malaysia Jul 2005-2008 BC/A 2 1 0.01% 
South Korea Oct 2000-May 2001 Assignment/BC 3 62.9 0.57% 
#  
A: Auction; BC: Beauty Contest         
Source: ICRA(ICRA Limited, 2009) 
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As can be seen from the above table majority of the nations in Europe went for the auctions 
method of allotting spectrum while majoring of nations in Asia went with Assignment or 
Beauty Contest methods of allotment of spectrum. The other startling fact that comes out 
from this graphic is the time lag which we are seeing in case of 3G rollout in India. Most of 
the countries listed in the table auctioned or allotted 3G air waves in 2000 – 2002; however 
India auctioned 3G airwaves only in 2011. 
High license cost in Germany and Europe became case studies to see if the licenses have been 
overvalued or not. High licenses costs coupled with low initial adoption of technology and 
high investment costs required to roll out the 3G services affected the financial performance 
of major operators in these countries. 
1.3 3G Auctions in India& Industry Snapshot 
India decided to go ahead with auctions methodology for allocating 3G airwaves. India is 
divided into 23 telecom circles. Indian government decided to auction 3G airwaves in the 2.1 
GHz band in blocks of 2 x 5 MHz with a maximum of 5 blocks per circle. In some of the 
circles 1 more block of 2 x 1.25 MHz in the 800 MHz was auctioned to any UASL licensee 
who was offering CDMA services. The objectives that Government of India set for the 3G 
auctions were
7
 (Department of Telecommunications, 2010), 
 To stimulate competition in the telecom sector 
 To ensure that operators don‟t hoard the spectrum and it is used efficiently 
 To maximize proceeds from the auction 
 To promote rollout of 3G & broadband services 
 To provide additional spectrum to existing 2G operators so that they can overcome 
the problem of scarcity of spectrum and hence improving quality of service 
 To obtain a market determined price for 3G spectrum 
Table 2as published by ICRA in their report on 3G & Its Implications for India Operators 
summarizes the salient features of the auction, 
 
 
                                                 
7
DOT, 3G & BWA Notice Inviting Applications for Auctions 
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Table 2 – Snapshot of rules of 3G auction in India 
Auction Rules Only one entity to be allowed to bid from the same Group. 
Eligibility 
3G spectrum – 2.1 GHz  band 
o     Any   entity   holding   Unified   Access   Service   (UAS)/Cellular   Mobile   
Telephone   Services (CMTS) License; or 
o     Any  entity  having  previous  3G  experience  whether  directly  or  through  
a  majority-owned subsidiary and undertaking to obtain a UAS license prior to 
commencement of operations 
Frequency Bands 
2 x 5 MHz in the 2.1 GHz band (maximum of 5 blocks per Circle) 
Rs. 35.0 billion for 2.1 GHz band 
Clock stage to determine the spectrum lot winners 
Assignment stage to assign specific frequency to the winners 
Bid Price Increments 
Negative demand: 0% increase 
Zero excess demand: 2% increase 
Demand in excess of 1 or 2 bidders: 5% increase 
Demand in excess of 3 or more bidders: 10% increase 
Allocation of Spectrum 
Successful  bidders  are  required  to  deposit  25%  of  the  auction  amount  
within  five  days  of  the close of auction and the remaining 75% within the 
next 10 days 
On  full  payment,  Department  of  Telecommunications  (DoT)  will  issue  a  
Letter  of  Intent  (LoI)  and would allocate spectrum within 15 days of full 
payment of the auction amount 
New spectrum winners would be allocated 3G spectrum after they have obtained 
UAS License 
Rollout Obligations 
At  the  end  of  5  years  from  the  date  of  spectrum  allocation  or  grant  of  
UAS  license  (if  applicable) whichever is  later,  the  service  provider  needs  
to  cover  90%  of  the  Metro  areas  and  50%  of  the District  Headquarters  
(DHQs)  or  cities  in  the  service  areas,  out  of  which  15%  of  the  DHQs  
must  be rural Short Distance Charging Areas 
Spectrum Usage Charges 
Spectrum  charges  for  existing  players  to  be  the  same  as  the  revised  
spectrum charges  for  2G spectrum. 3G spectrum is not to be counted to arrive 
at the relative slab of spectrum 
Standalone 3G carriers will be charged 3% of Adjusted Gross Revenue (AGR) 
after the first year of  allocation of spectrum,  which is equal to  license fees  
paid by a  2G carrier with base spectrum of 4.4 MHz of GSM spectrum  
Source: ICRA (ICRA Limited, 2009) 
 
The reserve price of the pan-India 3G spectrum as discovered during the auction (INR 16750 
crore) was almost 5 times its reserve price (INR 3500 crore) and that was the main motivation 
to do a valuation of the 3G license. Some of the qualitative reasons because of which licenses 
have received high valuations are, 
 Average Revenue per User. Declining Average Revenue per user because of a hyper 
competitive environment and innovative pricing by prepaid operators has put 
immense pressure on the profitability of mobile operators. 
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Figure 3 – ARPU trend in India 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
 
Figure 4 – Comparison of GSM & CDMA ARPU 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
 Spectrum Scarcity. Department of Telecom (DoT) has prescribed certain quality 
standards for providing mobile services. Operators were facing a tough time in 
adhering to these standards because of high subscriber and bandwidth requirement 
growth in face of a limited spectrum. This is especially true in case of Metros and 
Category A circles. 
 Mobile Number Portability. Mobile Number Portability was to be launched in India 
when 3G auctions were taking place. Operators vouched to get a piece of 3G 
spectrum in areas where they had a stronghold to retain their premium customers by 
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offering them better services and transferring them to 3G spectrum to provide them 
better voice quality and an enhanced user experience. 
 Broadband. 3G spectrum could be used by operators to provide broadband services. 
India‟s broadband penetration is abysmal and hence scope for growth is enormous in 
the future. Wireless broadband requires a low capital expenditure as compared to a 
wireline broadband coupled with the fact that ARPU of broadband is around INR 700 
while that of Mobile Services is around INR 110. 
Various operators that bid for the 3G spectrum included the incumbent operators such as 
Airtel, Aircel, Reliance Telecom, Idea Cellular, Vodafone Essar and TTSL. Some of the new 
entrants like Unitech Telenor and Sistema Shyam also bid for the 3G spectrum to compete 
with the incumbent operators. International operator like S-Tel also bid for the 3G spectrum. 
The circle wise list of operators and amount shelled by each of them is provided in appendix. 
The government raised a windfall of INR 67718.95 crore from the auctions. Out of this 
amount almost ~39% was raised from Delhi and Mumbai circles only. If we add the other 
three top circles of Karnataka, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh then it accounts for almost 
~65% of the bids. 
Aircel, Bharti & Reliance won 13 blocks of 2x5 MHz spectrum in 13 circles. Idea won 11, 
Vodafone won 9, TTSL won 9 and STel won 3 licenses. The interesting fact was that none of 
the operators won a pan-India license and hence we could see some collaboration between 
players to provide a seamless 3G access for their subscribers. 
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Figure 5 – Circle wise ARPU for Jan-Mar'10 Quarter 
Source: Cellular Operators Association of India 
 
Figure 6 – Circle wise mobile revenue for Jan-Mar'10 Quarter 
Source: Cellular Operators Association of India 
Figure 5 and Figure 6 represent the Average Revenue per User and Total Revenue for GSM 
Cellular subscribers. The data has been taken from COAI (Cellular Operators Association of 
India). High ARPU in Delhi and Mumbai because of the demographics of the subscribers and 
high revenue earning circles of Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Maharashtra 
have received the highest valuation for the license. The circle wise revenue earned from 
license is presented in the graph below.
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Figure 7 – Circle wise license fees paid by Operators 
Source: Medianama
8
 
 
Figure 8 – Circle Wise Allotment of 3G Spectrum to Operators 
Source: Medianama
9
 
Though we could draw some inferences from the limited data shown above regarding the 
high valuations paid for licenses in some of the circles, but the underlying revenue numbers 
for a quarter alone are not sufficient to draw inferences regarding whether licenses in some of 
the circles were undervalued, overvalued or valued correctly. 
There was an article in The Economic Time titled “The Shapley Value of 3G Auction”. As 
per the article in Shapley Valuation a payoff is assigned to a player based on its marginal 
contribution to a randomly selected coalition. Shapley value becomes important in the current 
context as none of the players has won a pan-India license and hence the players have to enter 
                                                 
8
http://www.medianama.com/2010/09/223-3g-mobile-india-spectrum, accessed on 10-03-2011 
9
http://www.medianama.com/2010/09/223-3g-mobile-india-spectrum, accessed on 10-03-2011 
Circle Aircel Bharti Idea Reliance STEL Tata Vodafone Total
Delhi 9950.79
Mumbai 9741.21
Maharashtra 4739.73
Gujarat 4394.82
AP 4119.42
Karnataka 3773.46
TN 3228.18
Kolkata 1632.78
Kerala 1542.12
Punjab 1288.04
Haryana 1093.71
UP (E) 963.09
UP (W) 937.44
Rajasthan 813.84
MP 775.08
WB 667.74
HP 494.52
Bihar 290.94
Orissa 148.92
Assam 126.9
NE 124.44
J&K 121.2
1959 - 1965 MHz 1969 - 1974 MHz 1974 - 1979 MHz 1964 - 1969 MHz
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into agreements with each other to provide roaming services to their subscribers. Higher the 
Shapley values, higher the competitive position. The table on the next page as appeared in 
The Economic Times reported that as per the Shapley Valuation Bharti, Vodafone and TATA 
underpaid for their licenses while Reliance, Aircel, Idea and STel overpaid for theirs‟. 
Table 3 – Shapley Valuation of Spectrum for Various Operators 
Company 
Shapley Value 
% 
Total Outlay 
% 
Value - Outlay 
Ratio Decision 
Bharti 24.27 24.12 1.01 Underpaid 
Vodafone 23.04 22.79 1.01 Underpaid 
Reliance 16.72 16.86 0.99 Overpaid 
Aircel 12.6 12.75 0.99 Overpaid 
Tata 11.55 11.5 1.00 Underpaid 
Idea 11.27 11.32 1.00 Overpaid 
STel 0.55 0.66 0.83 Overpaid 
All Players 100 100 1.00   
 
Source: The Economic Times
10
 
1.4 3G – Indian Perspective 
There are over 100 countries in the world which have adopted 3G technology. As per Morgan 
Stanley global 3G penetration should reach almost 46% by 2014 which translates into 2776 
Million 3G subscribers worldwide. 3G auctions were held in India in the timeframe of April – 
May 2010 and licenses were allocated to the auction winners by September 2010. The 
government received a windfall from the auctions. As per ICRA, the investment in 3G 
licenses is a good investment from a long term perspective however various telecom 
operators might face some cash flow issues in the short term primarily on account of high 
interest cost on the debt raised for paying the licenses and capital required for rolling out the 
3G networks. As per an “ICRA report titled 3G Telephony Services: Implications for Indian 
Operators”the impacts of investment in 3G licenses will manifest both in the long and short 
term. Some of the impacts are discussed here (ICRA Limited, 2009), 
 Telecom operators might face high interest burden in the initial years primarily on 
account of high debt burden because of huge investment in securing the license and 
the investments that would be required to roll out the 3G networks. 
                                                 
10
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/the-shapley-value-of-3g-auction/articleshow/6862694.cms, 
accessed on 10-03-2011 
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 Telecom operators would have to incur additional marketing costs to communicate 
about their 3G offerings. Since 3G penetration and growth is expected to be low in the 
initial years telecom companies might offer subsidies and bundled connection and 
phone in collaboration with 3G phone manufacturing company, this could suppress 
the margins in the early years. 
 3G technology would enable the growth of data services and Mobile broadband in 
India. Currently data services constitutes around 9% of the mobile ARPU, however 
once the 3G services will rollout this proportion is expected to go up to 25% and even 
more than that because of added applications, and enhanced user experience while 
availing data services because of better speed. 
 The rate at which mobile subscribers are growing in India had made the 2G spectrum 
available with the existing telecom operators a constraint for adding more subscribers. 
With 3G spectrum available to mobile companies, their subscribes would migrate 
from 2G to 3G platform thus vacating the 2G bandwidth which could be used to 
provide mobile services to new 2G subscribers. 
 With Mobile Number Portability being introduced in Indian Telecom Industry, the 
propensity of a premium consumer to switch from one operator to other operator has 
increased because the consumer can now retain his number. Offering better services 
and enhanced user experience can build a competitive advantage for a mobile operator 
which would stop its subscribers from hopping to other mobile service providers. 
 In the long term as the number of 3G subscribes will increase in our country, the 
mobile manufacturing companies would also achieve some scale in terms of 3G 
mobile phone market. This would bring the costs down and simultaneously mobile 
companies needn‟t provide subsidies on handset to simulate demand. 
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Figure 9 – Implications for 3G Operators 
Source: ICRA (ICRA Limited, 2009) 
1.4.1 3G Broadband 
India is a country with an abysmal broadband penetration. There were only 8 Million 
Broadband Subscribers out of a population of around 1.2 Billion. A 10% rise in broadband 
penetration can boost our GDP by 1.38%
11
. While landline broadband penetration is low 
because of supply side constraints in terms of high per subscriber capital expenditure required 
in case of landline broadband, the problem with wireless broadband provided by operators 
like MTS, TATA, BSNL and Reliance is that of Scale. Since the scale is small, the device is 
expensive and since the device is expensive the demand is less. Scalability is a concern in 
wireline broadband, while wireless broadband is a highly scalable model. 
 
Figure 10 – Broadband & Internet Subscribers in India 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
                                                 
11
 http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/%5C10-rise-in-broadband-penetration-will-lead-to-138-rise-in-
gdp%5C/418285, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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Broadband penetration has been low in the country. If we look at the number of broadband 
connections added between the 5 years from 2004 to 2009, the number stands around 7 
Million. This number is extremely low when compared to the number of mobile subscribers 
which are growing at a rate of 50 Million new subscribers in every quarter. 
 
 
Figure 11 – Wireless & Wireline Subscribers in India 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
 
Figure 12 – Quarterly net additions in wireless subscriber base in India 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
The sluggish performance of broadband in our country depends on both poor demand and 
supply economics. As per a report by consulting firm PWC titled Mobile Broadband – 
Outlook 2015(PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010), the capital expenditure per subscriber in 
a wireline broadband is around INR 90000 while the capital expenditure per subscriber in a 
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wireless broadband is as low as INR 3000. Some of the additional factors which have led to 
slow growth of broadband services in India are illustrated in the figure, 
 
Figure 13 – Drivers of Mobile Broadband in India 
Source: PWC (PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010) 
Compare the growth of broadband subscribers with the following graphic which shows the 
number of users who can access data from their mobile phones. 
 
Figure 14 – Mobile Data Subscribers in India 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
Though people are subscribing to data from their mobile phones using technologies like 
EDGE, GPRS the speed and the user experience is very low. Off late some CDMA operators 
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like Reliance, BSNL, MTS and MTNL are giving mobile broadband though data cards based 
on EV-DO technology. Reliance reported a figure of 2 Million EVDO subscribers
12
, while 
MTS and MTNL reported a figure of 0.25 Million
13
 and 0.815 Million subscribers
14
 
respectively. 
Given the constraints associated with Wireline Broadband, 3G is well poised to be India‟s 
champion for providing broadband services to the masses. While the recently concluded 4G 
auctions are providing alternate technologies like LTE (Long Term Evolution – Time 
Division Duplexing) and WiMAX which are better and faster than 3G, but the restriction of 
voice over 4G spectrum and high investment costs would mean that operators target these 
services towards subscribes which have high ARPU. These subscribers typically belong to 
urban areas and enterprise subscribers. Till WiMAX or LTE achieve a certain scale the 
devices with which to connect the internet would remain expensive. On the other hand 3G 
handsets are available for as low as INR 4700. Nokia launched its Nokia 2730 Classic model 
at a price point of INR 4700
15
. The availability of 3G devices at affordable prices would 
mean high volume of subscribers adopting 3G technology. This coupled with the fact that the 
capital expenditure involved in 3G technology is less means that 3G will drive the broadband 
growth in India in medium to long term.  
1.5 Drivers of 3G in India – Consumer & Operator Perspective 
A key metric for valuing the 3G license is the prospective subscriber base of 3G license in 
India. In this section we would try to elaborate some of the drivers for 3G in India which 
could help the operators achieve the critical mass in terms of number of subscribers so that 
their investment in 3G license is profitable. In order to analyze the drivers of 3G in India, a 
bifurcation has been done in terms of factors which are associated with the consumer and the 
factors which are associated with the wireless operator (PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 
2010). 
                                                 
12
http://convergence.in/blog/2011/01/07/reliance-netconnect-broadband-evdo-based-500-cities/, accessed on 10-
03-2011 
13
http://www.medianama.com/2010/05/223-mtnl-q4-10-mobile-revenue-at-rs-1840m-348k-3g-subs-broadband-
arpu-rs-592, accessed on 10-03-2011 
14
http://www.bsnlevdo.in/bsnl-evdo-news/mts-to-offer-14-7-mbps-speeds-through-cdma-dongles, accessed on 
10-03-2011 
15
http://techie-buzz.com/mobile-news/nokia-launches-nokia-2730-classic-cheapest-3g-handset-in-india.html, 
accessed on 10-03-2011 
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The consumer related factors are, 
 Quality of Service – Quality of service in terms of better user experience while 
accessing internet, streaming videos, playing online games, better applications and 
less frequent call drops.The quality of video calls and internet speed would depend on 
the coverage of network, density of Base Stations and number of subscribers per base 
station.  
 Applications and Content. The real impetus in giving an enhanced experience to the 
user would depend on the Applications that will be developed for the 3G technology 
and the quality of content that would be provided by the content providers. 
 Access Device. The adoption of 3G technology by a consumer would also depend on 
the cost of switching to 3G technology. For a subscriber, who is on a 2G technology, 
to switch to 3G technology would need an access device or 3G enabled phone. Since 
3G has been rolled out in over 100 countries, the device manufacturers have achieved 
the economies of scale and the prices of 3G devices are falling. The decrease in prices 
of 3G devices coupled with their backward compatibility with 2G systems would be a 
key driver for the uptake of 3G technology in India. As previous discussed, Nokia has 
launched a 3G enable handset at INR 4700 and going by the trends of the device 
prices that we saw during the reign of 2G technology 3G device prices are surely 
going to come down. 
 High Bandwidth Requirements. High bandwidths are required by enterprises and 
professionals living in urban areas because of mobility requirements to enhance the 
productivity. 3G would surely help in catering to these requirements given that the 
infrastructure is already in place to roll out the services. 
 Demographic Profile. As per a PWC report titled “Mobile Broadband – Outlook 
2015” India‟s population in the 20 – 29 age group will reach above 210 million by 
2015. Direct implication of this is their propensity to try the new and enhanced 
services provided by 3G technology and they would be the early adopters of the 
technology thus driving the 3G market in India (PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 
2010). 
The operator related factors are, 
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 Declining ARPU. Operators would turn to 3G to safeguard their profitability which is 
under pressure in a hyper competitive environment and the heavily skewed use profile 
towards prepaid subscribers. 
 Better Business Case. For operators rolling out broadband in a wireless environment 
makes a much better business case than rolling out broadband in a wireline 
environment. 
 Low Broadband Penetration. Operators see a huge potential in a market where 
broadband penetration is less than 1%.  
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2 Historical overview of Mobile Technology 
Current GSM and CDMA based mobile communication systems are basically 2G or 2
nd
 
Generation Mobile communication technology. Before 2G and 3G there was 1G or the 1
st
 
generation mobile communication technology. 1G technology was based on analog signals as 
compared to the present day technology which is digital. First commercial launch of a 3G 
systems was in the year 1979 by NTT in Japan. NMT (Nordic Mobile Telephone), AMPS 
(Advanced Mobile Phone System) and TACS (Total Access Communication System) are 
some of the example of the 1G telecommunication systems
16
. 
After almost a decade of 1G technology 2G technology was rolled out on GSM (Global 
System for Mobile Communications) standard in the year 1991 in Finland. The main 
advantage of 2G systems over 1G systems was that the technology was made digital. The 
inherent advantage of digital systems is that the data is encrypted and compressed thus 
allowing a more efficient use of the available bandwidth which translates into higher 
penetration for the same amount of available bandwidth. 2G systems also allowed data 
services which weren‟t there in the 1G technology17. 2G systems were primarily based on 
two technologies, 
 CDMA (Code Division Multiple Access) – CDMAone 
 TDMA (Time Division Multiple Access) – GSM 
CDMA and TDMA are channel access methods while CDMAone and GSM are standards of 
mobile technology. Channel Access Methods are explained in a further section. GSM 
technology is by far the most adopted technology across the world with a worldwide 
penetration of 80% among all the wireless subscribers. 2G systems were built primarily for 
voice communication and limited amount of data communication (SMSs etc.). The spectrum 
used by 2G services is in the range of 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz and 1900 MHz with a 
limited speed of around 14 Kbps. By the end of the century 20
th
 century voice services no 
longer remained the focus area for the mobile communications engineers and the demand for 
a faster way to access the internet from mobile device started picking momentum
18
. This led 
to the development of new standards like GPRS (2.5G) and EDGE (2.75G). Though the 
                                                 
16
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2G, accessed on 10-03-2011 
17
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2G, accessed on 10-03-2011 
18
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3G, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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speeds were limited on these standards, however they were much better than the speed of a 
2G network. GPRA could support up to 115 Kbps while EDGE could support up to 236.8 
Kbps of data speeds. These standards were used to provide Media Messaging Services, 
Pocket Internet and Wireless Application Protocols. We will now discuss about the two most 
prominent 2G technologies which are prevalent across the world, 
2.1 GSM 
Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) is most widely adopted mobile technology 
standard. As per GSM association almost 80% of the mobile subscribers are on GSM 
networks. There were over 3.45 Billion GSM subscribers in Q2 2009
19
. GSM is a 2G 
technology with both the voice signal which is encoded and the signal over which voice is 
encoded are digital. The main advantage over GSM over any other technology is that you can 
use your phone anywhere because of high penetration of GSM technology. GSM is based on 
cellular technology which means that when the phone connects to the operator‟s network by 
searching for the nearby cells. The service areas are divided into cells of various sizes. The 
size of the cell depends upon the signal strength and the number of subscribers in a given 
service area. The more the number of subscribers the smaller the cell size as a base station 
required by GSM technology can serve only a limited number of subscribers. Radius of the 
cell could vary from a few hundred meters to few kilometers. The largest possible radius 
supported by GSM specification is 35 KM. 
2.2 CDMAone 
CDMAone is a front name for IS-95 standard. This standard is also based on cellular 
technology. CDMA is actually the channel access method used by IS-95 standard. In CDMA 
channel is such that several clients can use the same frequency. In case of GSM channel 
access method is TDMA which means only one client can access the channel at a single time 
and access is granted to various clients in a sequential manner. The advantage of CDMAone 
vis-à-vis GSM is that in CDMAone all clients can access the channel anytime and hence 
there is no direct relation between channel capacity and a limit on the number of active 
subscribers. In case of GSM if an operator wants to add subscribers to an existing cell which 
is already running full capacity the operator might need to split the cell into smaller cells, 
while in case of CDMA the number of cells required would be lesser than that of GSM with 
                                                 
19
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GSM, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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same number of subscribers and hence CDMA channel access method provides a huge 
economical advantage to mobile operators
20
. 
2.3 Channel Access Method/Air Technology 
Channel Access Method in the simplest possible language could be described as a permission 
mechanism by which the signal which we wish to send is given a permit to transmit over a 
channel. When there are multiple users who are attached to the same channel there arise a 
problem of who will access the channel and in what sequence the access would be granted. In 
case of mobile technology, there are two kinds of signals, 
 Carrier Signal – Carrier signal is the mother signal over which the signal which we 
wish to send is piggybacked. There are various technologies to piggyback the 
voice/data signal over the carrier signal. The discussion of those technologies is not 
relevant in the scope of this research. 
 Modulating Signal – This is the user generated or received signal.  
The two kinds of channel methods which are more prevalent in wireless telecommunications 
industry are TDMA and CDMA. 
2.3.1 TDMA 
TDMA is the channel access method in which each user shares the same frequency and the 
access to channel is given on a sequential basis. Most of the 2G systems except CDMAone 
are based on TDMA
21
. 
2.3.2 CDMA 
CDMA is based on a spread spectrum technology in which the bandwidth of the modulated 
carrier signal is much more than the bandwidth of the modulating signal. This form of 
channel access method is much more economically favorable than TDMA
22
. 
2.4 Cellular Technology 
A Cellular network is a radio network whose use is widespread in mobile communications. 
The name cellular network comes from the word “Cell”. In this kind of network the coverage 
area is divided into number of territories known as cells. Each cell has a Base station with 
                                                 
20
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IS-95, accessed on 10-03-2011 
21
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Time_division_multiple_access, accessed on 10-03-2011  
22
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Code_division_multiple_access, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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which a number of mobile from that cell interacts. These Base Stations are connected to each 
other on a backbone network. Each and every connection which is established between a 
mobile phone and other mobile phone or an internet server is routed through the base station. 
The advantage of having a Cellular Network is
23
, 
 Reduced Power Requirements 
 Increased Coverage 
 Increased Capacity 
 Reduced Interference from other signals 
 
Figure 15 – Cellular Network 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellular_network, accessed on 10-03-2011 
2.5 What is 3G? 
“International Mobile Telecommunications – 2000 (IMT – 2000), popularly known as 3G or 
3
rd
 generation, is a mobile communication standard fulfilling the requirements as specified 
by the International Telecommunication Union”24. The advantage over 3G over the present 
day mobile communication systems is the wide range of applications that can be run over it 
because of the higher bandwidth available in the 3G technology. As per the IMT – 2000 
specification 3G systems should support at least 200 Kbps of peak data speed. HSPA 
technology which is an evolution of 3G technology can theoretically support up to 56 Mbps 
downlink speed.Applications that a 3G network could possibly support are wide area wireless 
telephony, video calls, mobile internet access and mobile TV. 
                                                 
23
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cellular_network, accessed on 10-03-2011 
24
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3G, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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The following major standards come under the umbrella of 3G technologies. These are also 
the technologies which could be used in India. 
2.5.1 UMTS 
Universal Mobile Telecommunication Systems (UMTS) is technology which has been 
standardized by 3GPP (3
rd
 Generation Partnership Project) and is primarily adopted by 
countries where GSM was prevalent. Some of the counties which have adopted UMTS are 
Europe, Japan and China. UMTS technology can be implemented using different 
multiplexing technologies. The signal is based on a direct sequence WCDMA which has a 
radio frequency bandwidth of 5 MHz, which could be operated in two different modes 
(Tanguturi & Harmantzisa, 2006), 
 Time Division Duplexing (Multiple Access) – In this signals are spread over time and 
the access of the spectrum is sequential. In this mode uplink and downlink 
frequencies are transmitted in the same carrier band. 
 Frequency Division Duplexing (Multiple Access) – In this mode signals are spread 
over the same spectrum and are spread over frequency and the access of the spectrum 
is not sequential as in the case of TDD. In this mode uplink and downlink frequencies 
are transmitted in two different bands of frequencies. 
In India FDD will be implemented and the spectrum allocated clearly demarcates the 
spectrum boundaries for various carriers for both uplink and downlink frequencies
23
. 3G 
phones based on UMTS technology are generally hybrid to support GSM technology as well 
so as to provide a seamless connectivity while moving from one geographic region to other 
where mobile signals are based on a backward technology. WCDMA systems are notorious 
for their heavy bandwidth requirements
25
. The competing technology cdma2000 which is 
discussed in the next section is more efficient in terms of usage of bandwidth. The frequency 
bands as defined under UMTS standards are 1885 – 2025 MHz for uplink channel and 2110 – 
2200 MHz for downlink channel
24
. 
2.5.2 CDMA2000 
CDMA2000 is another 3G standard which is a direct evolution from CDMA
26
. The various 
standards which come under the umbrella of CDMA2000 are CDMA2000 1X, CDMA2000 
                                                 
25
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Universal_Mobile_Telecommunications_System, accessed on 10-03-2011 
26
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CDMA2000, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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EV-DO Rev. 0, CDMA2000 EV-DO Rev. A, and CDMA2000 EV-DO Rev. B
25
. The 
advantage of CDMA2000 is that it could be deployed in the same band of spectrum as its 
predecessor technology IS-95 (CDMAone). 
“The world’s first 3G commercial system was launched by SK Telecom (South Korea) in 
October 2000, using CDMA2000 1X. CDMA2000 can support mobile data communications 
at speeds ranging from 144 Kbps to 2 Mbps.”27 
Bandwidth required by CDMA2000 systems is 1.25MHz times (1, 3, 6, 9 or 12). In India 3G 
spectrum for CDMA2000 standard have been offered in blocks of 1.25 MHz. Companies like 
Reliance, TATA, MTS and BSNL were offering 3G mobile broadband services on EV-DO 
(Evolutionary Data Optimized) platform much before the auction of 3G spectrum as they 
could do that on their existing 2G CDMA spectrum.  
2.6 Technology Evolution Path & Future Technologies 
 
Figure 16 – Evolution of Wireless Technology 
The figure above describes the evolution of mobile technology since the inception of wireless 
communication around 1980. India is lagging by almost a decade as far as adoption and 
rollout of 3G technology is concerned. As far as 4G is concerned the licenses were auctioned 
last year along with the licenses of 3G spectrum. However there has been no clarity as to 
when the operators would be launching 4G services and which technology platform would 
they use. The restriction of voice over 4G and expensive access devices are the major 
impediments hampering the business case of 4G in India in the near future. India is currently 
using 2G technology for mobile wireless communications.  
                                                 
27
http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2008-04-07/tech-jargon/27762820_1_cdma2000-imt-2000-cdma-
development-group, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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2.6.1 Evolution of 3G 
The speed that 2G offers is very less as compared to 3G. There have been few improvements 
and new releases of 2G GSM standard like GPRS and EDGE which have improved the data 
throughput speeds. EDGE has been considered a pre 3G technology and is part of ITU‟s 3G 
definition
28
. Though the speeds on offer by EDGE could be compared to 256 Kbps DSL 
broadband, however the circuit switch technology which it uses leads to a loss in efficiency 
of the network and a diminished user experience. The other problem with EDGE was that the 
standards which were being followed to develop the networks were different for different part 
of the world where the technology was deployed.  
It was because of the non-standardization of the technology that The International 
Telecommunication Union stepped up its effort to create a network whose services are 
independent of the technology platform whose network design standards are same globally 
and thus began the 3GPP (3
rd
 Generation Partnership Project)
29
. The official standard set by 
ITU for 3G networks is IMT-2000. In Europe the standard was christened as UMTS 
(Universal Terrestrial Mobile System). IMT2000 is the ITU-T name for the third 
generationsystem, while cdma2000 is the name of the American 3Gvariant
27
. WCDMA is the 
technology platform in UMTS with base station or nod B, RNC (Radio Network Controller), 
apart from WMSC (Wideband CDMA Mobile Switching Centre) and SGSN/GGSN
27
. 3G 
standard gives a total mobile experience with wide area voice and video telephony with 
broadband and data services at a high speed. New releases and advancements of 3G 
technology has led to the evolution of HSPA technology (High Speed Packet Access) which 
can offer speeds up to 14.4 Mbps on Downlink and 5.8 Mbps Uplink. 
2.6.2 Evolution of 4G (AII – IP) 
The 4G standard is the successor to 2G and 3G technology standards. The two competing 
technologies which are vying to be the major 4G technology are LTE (Long Term Evolution) 
and WiMAX (Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access).4G set the peak speed 
requirements of 100 Mbps for high mobility communication and 1 Gbps for low mobility 
communication
30
. The main principles behind the initiation of the 4G project are represented 
in the graphic below. 
                                                 
28
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Enhanced_Data_Rates_for_GSM_Evolution, accessed on 10-03-2011 
29
www.iject.org/pdf/amit.pdf, accessed on 10-03-2011 
30
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4G, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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Figure 17 – Guiding Principles for 4G Technology 
Source: Wikipedia
31 
4G system is expected to provide ultra-broadband Internet access on a fully mobile platform 
and is expected to provide services like IP telephony, Gaming, and Live Video Streaming. 
WiMAX and LTE are the pre-4G technologies; however they are branded as the 4G 
technology for marketing purpose. Nonetheless ITU has said that these technologies could be 
considered as 4G technologies provided they are in the consideration to reach the standard set 
by ITU for 4G mobile wireless. Following table has been taken from the page on 4G on 
Wikipedia. It gives a data rate comparison for various wireless technologies
29
, 
Table 4 – Comparison of Wireless Technologies 
Standard Family Primary Use Radio Tech Downlink 
(Mbit/s) 
Uplink 
(Mbit/s) 
LTE UMTS/4GSM General 4G OFDMA/MIMO/SC-
FDMA 
100 (in 20MHz 
bandwidth) 
50 (in 20 
MHz 
bandwidth) 
UMTS-TDD UMTS/3GSM Mobile Internet CDMA/TDD 16   
UMTS W-
CDMA 
UMTS/3GSM General 3G CDMA/FDD 0.384 0.384 
HSDPA+HSUPA       14.4 5.76 
HSPA+     CDMA/FDD/MIMO 56 22 
HIPERMAN HIPERMAN Mobile Internet OFDM 56.9   
EDGE Evolution GSM Mobile Internet TDMA/FDD 1.6 0.5 
Flash-OFDM 
  
  
Flash-OFDM 
  
  
Mobile Internet 
mobility up to 
200mph (350km/h) 
  
Flash-OFDM 
  
  
5.3 1.8 
10.6 3.6 
15.9 5.4 
EV-
DO 1x Rev. 0 
CDMA2000 Mobile Internet CDMA/FDD 2.45 0.15 
EV-
DO 1x Rev.A. 
CDMA2000     3.1 1.8 
                                                 
31
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EV-DO Rev.B. CDMA2000     4.9xN 1.8Xn 
1xRTT CDMA2000 Mobile phone CDMA 0.144   
iBurst 802.2 Mobile Internet HC-
SDMA/TDD/MIMO 
95 36 
WiMAX 802.16 Mobile Internet MIMO-SOFDMA 128 (in 20MHz 
bandwidth) 
56 (in 
20MHz 
bandwidth) 
Wi-Fi 802.11 Mobile Internet OFDM/MIMO 300 (using 4x4 configuration 
in 20MHz bandwidth) or 600 
(using 4x4 configuration in 
40MHz bandwidth) 
  
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/4G accessed on 10-03-2011 
2.7 Migration Path to 3G 
Migration path to 3G depends on the technology platforms on which the operators are 
offering 2G services. If they are offering 2G services on a GSM platform then the likely 
platform for them to migrate is WDCMA. While CDMA players are expected to migrate to 
CDMA2000 platform. Migration to CDMA2000 platform though requires less Upgradation 
costs however handset subsidy costs would be higher and hence dual technology platform 
operators should weigh the pros and cons of both the technology platform before deciding on 
the migration path (ICRA Limited, 2009). 
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3 Literature Review 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) valuation is the most common method to value real assets 
whose future cash flows can be forecasted with certain degree of predictability. The net 
present value of a project can be calculated by discounting the cash flows which are expected 
from the project at a certain discount rate which represents the risk of the project. This 
discount rate is weighted average cost of capital for a project whose risk matches the average 
risk of the projects of the firm. However if a project‟s risk differs considerably from the 
firm‟s average risk then the WACC is adjusted upwards or downwards to arrive at the new 
discount rate for the project depending on whether the project is more risky or less risky 
respectively (Brandao, Dyer, & Hahn, 2005). 
DCF method criticized for one of its inherent and structural weakness which is that the 
project‟s value will remain same and unaffected despite any future decisions by the 
management of the firm or the project (Brandao, Dyer, & Hahn, 2005). As a project runs 
through its useful life a manager might want to bring about some changes and depart from the 
original plan of action. Such departure from the initially conceived plan of action is not 
represented adequately by the DCF model which assumes that the investments are made at 
predetermined time intervals. We can incorporate Monte-Carlo analysis to vary the shape of 
the probability distribution of the actual investment; however we can‟t change the time at 
which that investment will be made.  
Consider an investment where a pharmaceutical company invests in the trial of a new drug, if 
the trial is successful the company will launch the new drug in the market if it is not then the 
company would stop further research and development in this new drug. Though this is a 
pretty straight forward scenario where the financial manager can incorporate decision tree 
analysis to evaluate the scenario, however actual problems in real life can be very different 
and in such cases instead of investing all capital upfront a more strategic investment plan 
might be the need. 
Some of the examples of project flexibilities are (Brandao, Dyer, & Hahn, 2005), 
 Expanding operations in response to affirmative response from the market 
 Deferring a particular investment or abandoning it completely if it underperforms 
 Scaling down the project in case the project has reached a maturity state and the 
returns have hit the cap. 
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As the uncertainty in various facets of long term and strategic investments increases Real 
options will find broad application as a strategic tool. Leslie and Michaels (Leslie & 
Michaels, 1997) discuss some of the fundamental differences that exist between the 
traditional discounted cash flow valuation (DCF) and the Real option valuation using Black 
Scholes & Merton options theory. 
 They argue that traditional methods like DCF ignore the value of flexibility and strategic 
decision making and hence they tend to ignore the additional value embedded in investment 
opportunities where the investment is irreversible and constitutes a huge cost to the company 
(Leslie & Michaels, 1997). Real option methodology empowers the management to capture 
the value of this flexibility (Alleman, 2002). 
They discuss the case of a hypothetical oil company and take some hypothetical values of 
present value of cash flows and present value of investment required in an oil well to be made 
by the company such that the NPV is negative. Now in such a case ordinarily a project would 
get rejected, however they claim that while doing the DCF NPV analysis we ignore the value 
of the uncertainty in the project which would accrue to the project from uncertain future oil 
prices and uncertainty vis-à-vis the level of production of oil. Though we can incorporate a 
certain degree of variability in DCF methodology using Monte-Carlo and sensitivity analysis, 
however the timing of the investment decisions can‟t be controlled strategically in case of a 
DCF analysis. They argue that DCF valuation ignores the value of learning from the project 
which a Real option methodology would take into account. They also suggest that the value 
hidden in the form of learning and flexibility in terms of project execution would be of much 
more importance to financial and project managers working in capital intensive sectors. DCF 
methodology assumes that the capital investment decision is a one-time decision, however 
when a high amount of capital is involved such huge investment decisions are rarely taken in 
one go and rather they are strategic decisions and receive a continuous feedback from the 
limited execution of the project and market forces (Leslie & Michaels, 1997).  
They also put forward a completely new and interesting facet to real options methodology by 
suggesting that apart from being a better methodology for strategic investment projects real 
options methodology also refines the management‟s thinking. They say that when a manager 
begins to think about a decision from an options perspective his thinking changes as the 
process of analyzing the options hidden in an investment is a very systematic one and instead 
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of viewing uncertainty negatively a manager could look at the possible ways in which he 
could maximize his gains from the same. 
 
Figure 18 -- Differences between Net Present Value & Real Options Valuation Approach 
(Leslie & Michaels, 1997) 
Another literature (Kemma, 1993) attempts to gain insights into the Real Option valuation 
methodology by means of applying the theory to various practical case applications which 
were developed by the author (Angelien G.Z. Kemma) in collaboration with an Oil MNC. 
The major insights gained from the author‟s experience while working with the management 
and planning team of the Oil MNC are, 
 Before applying the real option valuation methodology it is important for the 
management to realize that certain strategic financial decisions are better evaluated 
using Real Options theory rather that the traditional discount rate valuation. The 
management should not complicate the decision making by creating too many options 
as that would lead to complexity and more importantly options should not be thought 
of as investment alternatives. Before actually going ahead with the analysis it is 
important to realize the sources of volatility in the future cash flows and how to 
quantify it. Lastly competition and cash flows which could have been availed by early 
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exercise should be factored in to calculate the value of the embedded options 
(Kemma, 1993). 
 Discounted cash flow valuations and Real option valuation are not competitive and 
substitute techniques, rather both are complementary techniques as the inputs to the 
real option theory comes from the output of DCF valuation. DCF technique is more 
suited when the investment decision is under passive management and risk associated 
with different projects could be appropriately quantified using different discount rates 
(Kemma, 1993). 
 The benefit of the real options technique to management could be bifurcated into two 
parts. First is that it leads to a better and more structured approach while the second is 
the ease with which flexibilities in the decision making could be modeled (Kemma, 
1993). 
 Though real options methodology has many advantages, the major disadvantage that 
this technique suffers from is that of quantifying the underlying volatility which is an 
important input to the model. For this very reason real options methodology has find 
its application mainly in fields where the accrued cash flow is a function of the price 
of a natural resource (Kemma, 1993). Prices of natural resources are quoted and their 
volatility could be found with much more ease. 
Though it is comparatively easier to apply real options methodology to problems where cash 
flows are related to the prices of the natural resources, it doesn‟t diminish the capacity of the 
Real Options methodology to be applied to different areas under different circumstances. 
Real Options methodology has find its way in projects related to irreversible decisions under 
uncertainty in the field of IT (Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999).  
Michael Benaroch and Robert J. Kauffman (Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999) posits that the 
literature on the application of real options pricing models like Black-Scholes option pricing 
model and Binomial pricing model though provide useful insights from a strategic point of 
view in irreversible decisions under uncertainty, they are often based on cases which are 
hypothetical. In this paper the important contribution to the field of real option pricing are 
that it provides a theoretical background and explanation for the rationality of BS and 
Binomial model in the subject of Information Technology Investments.  
Secondly, they argue that much like the traditional DCF techniques, the real option technique 
by virtue of its assumptions place a limit to the spectrum of problems of IT investments that 
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could be analyzed using real options and lastly the paper demonstrates the application of real 
option techniques to a real life problem. The investment decision that they analyze is the 
timing decision of the deployment of Point of Sale Debit Services by a company (Benaroch 
& Kauffman, 1999). 
Though real options do provide some very useful insights into an irreversible decision under 
uncertainty in an Information Technology setting, the professionals who evaluate these 
decisions are typically ill equipped to use real option pricing techniques. They are acquainted 
to DCF NPV techniques or simple cost benefit analysis. However, the underlying logic of 
using option pricing where one can time the decision regarding scaling of the project, 
deferring the project or even abandoning it depending on the learning from the project could 
of immense relevance to these professionals (Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999).  
A particular relevance of this paper was that it showed how real options pricing technique 
could be used in evaluating capital decisions involving non traded information technology 
assets. This is particularly important as capital budgeting decisions analyze the assets as 
though they were being traded, which makes sense also, as any organization is assigned a 
value by the market by way of market capitalization (Benaroch & Kauffman, 1999). 
Another paper posits that the decisions in Information Technology are often characterized by 
high uncertainty and irreversible capital decisions. The uncertainty increases when there is a 
high degree of innovation in that particular sector. Some of the sources of uncertainties could 
be the emergence of an alternate and superior technology and the rate of adoption of the new 
technology thus affecting the timing of the payoffs (Fichman, 2004).  
The value of the option increases the motivation of the early adopters of the technology and 
financial experts in the field of real options see Information Technology as a likely sector 
where Real options methodology could be used to exploit the strategic value of IT 
investments (Fichman, 2004). 
The problem which is attempted to solve with the help of the theory of real options is the 
timing decision of when a firm should innovate with an emerging technology and what could 
be its possible implications. Useful insights into managing, launching and valuing an 
innovative Information Technology platform are also provided. The real options that could be 
created in an IT investment are Pilot Projects, which if successful can lead to full-fledged 
development and deployment of a new technology (Fichman, 2004).  
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The theory of real option pricing has also found its application in the technology investments 
in the Automobile sector. Neely III and Neufville in their paper combine the decision making 
under the DCF analysis and real option analysis to evaluate a portfolio of technological 
improvements (Neely III & Neufville, 2001). 
They posit that planners are risk managers and professionals who are in planning division 
should realize the potential of real options and exploit it to get better at their job of managing 
risk. The professionals who are in the planning division or the controllers in financial 
parlance should recognize the value of management control and the exercise of selections at 
critical junctures. For these professional real options is an effective tool to quantify this value 
(Neely III & Neufville, 2001). 
The scope for the applications of real options theory is very wide. Till now we have seen how 
real options theory has been exploited by various researchers in multitude of areas ranging 
from oil exploration to information technology.  
We will now discuss some of the really diverse applications. Real options theory has also 
been used to actively manage risk in research and development setting. (Herath & Bremser, 
2005) 
Research and Development investments resemble financial option properties in many ways. 
The initial investment in an R&D project is high and capital intensive with no immediate 
cash flows, long time to maturity (longer time horizon projects), multiple sources of 
uncertainty and hence the volatility which affects the option value (Herath & Bremser, 2005). 
In their paper Chang, Hung & Tsai provide a new approach to valuate Intellectual property. 
(Chang, Hung, & Tsai, 2005). They incorporate a sensitivity variable so that they can account 
for the volatility in the rate of return. So in addition to the scenario where the rate of return is 
kept constant they add a scenario where it can go up with certain volatility. The value 
addition that they provide in addition to the previous research on the similar topic is that they 
show that the volatility of the future cash flows motivate the firms to invest now than later. 
Till this point most the literature that has been discussed is relevant from the point of view of 
methodology and usefulness of real options technique. We haven‟t so far discussed the 
application of real options technique in the domain of telecommunications in general and 
more specifically we haven‟t discussed the application of real options in valuing a 3G license. 
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Mkhize & Moja in their research discuss the application of real options valuation technique in 
the cellular telecommunications industry in South Africa (Mkhize & Moja, 2009). They 
discuss about the evaluation of investment that managers in the telecommunication industry 
of South Africa might have to make in the next generation technologies.  
Investment in the next generation technology incorporates a fair degree of uncertainty and 
real options theory using Black Scholes method and Binomial models have been found 
effective while making capital budgeting decisions (Mkhize & Moja, 2009).  
Cellular operators are often required to take complex decisions regarding whether to deploy a 
new technology or keep using the existing one. The sources of volatility while doing capital 
budgeting decision analysis are the volatile demand of the customer, high initial expenditure 
and a threat of a new and a better technology.  
They calculate the total investment value of the new project as the sum of the passive Net 
present value (which is the base case discounted cash flow analysis) plus the option value 
which arises from various strategic opportunities that managers might encounter during the 
course of the project. They conclude that the value of the project is much more than that 
calculated using a traditional DCF as a premium was added to it in the form of option value.  
Another application of real options valuation technique is explained by Basili & Fontini in 
their valuation of the 3G license in the United Kingdom(Basili & Fontini, 2003). They 
calculated the aggregate option value of the 3G licenses which were auctioned in UK in the 
year 2000. 
Telecommunications industry is considered to be one of the central bones of the economy and 
the application of auction to allocate 3G airwaves to various bidders is considered to be one 
of the most effective economic paradigms of a real life problem (Basili & Fontini, 2003).  
The revenues which were generated in the auction exceeded the government‟s initial estimate 
by a far greater amount. Though the government received a windfall in the auction process 
the operators were tied down under huge debt burden and within 2 years after the auctions 
European telecommunication firms started doubting the ability of an auction to maximize the 
total surplus and not just the government‟s surplus. The stocks of the firms which had bid for 
the license performed badly after the auctions which led analysts to believe that the market is 
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discounting the future earnings of these firms at a higher discount rate because of the 
perceived risk because of heavy debt burden (Basili & Fontini, 2003). 
The option value of the license is calculated in the article and it has been shown that the value 
of the project roughly corresponds to the value of the fees extracted from the bidders (Basili 
& Fontini, 2003). 
It is widely believed that the telecommunication firms in the Europe lost a lot market value 
because of the perceived high price paid for the 3G spectrum, nonetheless, a real option 
valuation shows that the value extracted from the project is approximately equal to the value 
paid for the licenses. 
The loss in value of the telecom firms could not be explained on the basis of the high prices 
paid for the license, instead the authors brings in the discussion of a very crucial aspect of the 
3G technology which is the killer applicationthat is required to get the users hooked to your 
network and hence resulting in a higher ARPU. In the absence of such applications and 
difficulties regarding the handset (Access Device) and the general downward trend in the 
Economic scenario were given as the probably reasons for the loss in value. They also 
mentioned that over a long term such as 20 years which is also the term of the license such 
effects might not remain that relevant and eventually the technology might take off (Basili & 
Fontini, 2003). Logically too, these possibilities are taken care of by the real options 
methodology inherently because of the incorporation of the volatility of the future cash flows 
as an input in the valuation model and hence the added value. 
Another recent literature in this field tries to evaluate the value of the transferability value of 
the telecommunication license. The driver behind such kind of research is the fact that in 
most of the nation when government allots a telecommunication license it also stipulates that 
the license could not be transferred to another telecom operators. Stipulation like the one 
mentioned above might cause inconvenience to the customers and hence removal of the 
option is the best solution in such cases. When removal is considered there is an added value 
to the original license and hence an option is embedded in the original license which should 
be valued to arrive at the final price of the license (Mastroeni & Naldi, 2010).  
In most of the countries when the government assigns the telecommunication licenses to 
various firm, they also set out certain time bound conditions like rollout etc. In case a 
company is not able to achieve its target within the stipulated time, the government might 
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reassign the spectrum but that would take a lot of time and resources. If the government 
allows reselling of the spectrum the bidders would look at this as an embedded option in the 
license which gives them an option to exit the project in case it doesn‟t suit their 
operations.This also will increase the value of the license at the time of the auction 
(Mastroeni & Naldi, 2010). 
In their paper Stille, Limme and Brandao analyze the real option methodology in the 
Decision making process in the Telecommunication Industry. They study the 3G license 
auctions which allocated 3G spectrums to various operators who wish to operate 3G mobile 
services in Brazil (Stille, Lemme, & Brandao, 2010).  They had calculated 64% premium on 
the license when the value of the license was calculated using Real options methodology as 
compared to discounted cash flow methodology. Their results show that real options 
methodology can be used by telecom operators in other countries to find the worth of the 
investment in 3G license before actually investing in it. 
The degree of similarity that they brought forward between a license and auction so as to 
justify their methodology of following real options valuation is (Stille, Lemme, & Brandao, 
2010), 
 There are a large number of factors which make the investment in the rollout of the 
mobile services a strategic investment which needs to be managed actively as against 
a passive investment. This gives rise to a volatility which is adequately taken into 
consideration in a Real options methodology. 
 The acquisition of the license gives the operator the right and not the obligation to 
invest in the rollout of 3G services. The operator can decide to invest at a small scale 
and then based on the market expectations and expected future demand it may decide 
to scale up its investment. In short timing of the decision to undertake an irreversible 
financial decision is very important. 
 The third characteristic of the license that increases its option value and thus 
justifying the use of real options methodology is that the license represents a strong 
barrier to entry from the competition and hence increases the value of the option. 
The methodology that they follow is a pretty straightforward one. The follow the following 
sequence (Stille, Lemme, & Brandao, 2010), 
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 Calculate the static NPV of the asset which in this case is license. NPV is calculated 
using expected level of cash flows generated from the license and the WACC. 
 In the next step they calculated the volatility of the returns of the project. 
 Once they had the volatility they proceeded to the option valuation step. 
So far we have discussed the advantages of real option valuation methodology versus the 
discounted cash flow valuation methodology; we then discussed some of the relevant 
literature exploiting the importance of real option valuation methodology. 
Though real options have wide applications across various Capital investment decision 
situations practitioners do get bogged down by the higher mathematics involved in the real 
options valuation theory. A simple framework which could be applied to various practical 
situations and is backward compatible with the Discounted Cash Flow valuation method and 
valuation sheets is provided by Luehrman in an article in Harvard Business 
Review(Luehrman, 1998).  
Though the framework is not that effective when the analysis requires absolute precision 
however it gives a good starting point to analyze strategic decision making under uncertainty. 
On top of giving a good head start the valuation and insights that the framework provides are 
definitely better than the base case DCF analysis. Luehrman draws an analogy between an 
investment opportunity before a company to a call option as the organization has a right to 
invest but is not under the obligation to do so. Luehrman considers the case of a European 
Call Option and then he tries to map the parameters of the investment opportunity over the 
parameters of the European Call Option (Luehrman, 1998). The mapping is displayed in the 
graphic below. 
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Figure 19 – Analogies between a Real Option and a Financial Call Option 
(Luehrman, 1998) 
4 Methodology 
This research attempts to find the aggregate value of the 3G spectrum licenses which were 
auctioned last year. To calculate the value of the 3G license it has been considered as a 
project and then we have tried to calculate the aggregate value of the project for which the 
methodology has been explained below, 
 A discounted cash flow analysis has been done on the expected earnings (cash-flows) 
which would result from the deployment of the 3G technology. The DCF analysis serves as 
the base case for our real option valuation purpose and some of the outputs which would be 
generated in the process of doing DCF would be used to calculate the option value of the 
project. The projections and assumptions used for estimating the future earnings/cash-flows 
are explained in the chapter. 
 Sensitivity analysis done on the NPV obtained from the DCF model to see the risk 
associated with the project. 
 Real option valuation is the last step in the valuation process to calculate the value of 
the option. Options associated with the project are identified and then Real Option valuation 
model is used to find the value of the option. The model which is used is explained in a 
further section. 
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4.1 Discounted Cash Flow Valuation 
Under the purview of discounted cash flow valuation following two methods are used, 
 Net Present Value Method. Under NPV method net present value of the company is 
calculated by discounting the cash flows from a project at a risk adjusted rate of return. NPV 
is the difference of the present value of cash inflows from the project and the present value of 
the investment overlay that will go into the project. 
      ∑
  
      
   
   
 
Where, 
T – Useful life of the project 
R – Risk adjusted discount rate of the project 
Cn – Net Cash flow in period ’n’ inclusive of investment outlays 
The above equation could be re-written as, 
        
Where, 
S – Net present value of the cash inflows from the project 
K – Net present value of the investment overlay for the project 
The decision criterion for NPV method is, 
       
 Internal Rate of Return. Internal rate of return is the discount rate at which NPV of 
the project becomes zero. It is the rate of return generated by the project. Though there are 
some loopholes associated with the IRR method, we would restrict ourselves to the basics of 
IRR. The equation for IRR is, 
∑
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Where, 
T – Useful life of the project 
Cn – Net Cash flow in period ’n’ inclusive of investment outlays 
I – Discount Rate (Internal Rate of Return) 
The decision criterion for Internal Rate of Return rule is, 
    
Where, 
I – IRR 
R – Risk adjusted rate of return required from the project 
Though we discussed the disadvantages of the DCF valuation in the previous section, just to 
reiterate, the main disadvantage of using NPV method is aptly highlighted by (Brandao, 
Dyer, & Hahn, 2005) contending that NPV method doesn‟t take into consideration  
managerial flexibility and hence strategies like “wait and see” and “pilot project” can‟t be 
taken into account while valuing the project. 
Since DCF valuation will serve as a base case scenario we will first try to calculate the NPV 
and IRR of the project before doing a real option valuation. 
4.2 Real Option Valuation 
We will now discuss the model that we will use to calculate the value of the real option. For 
calculating the value we will use the Black-Scholes model (Damodaran, 2000), 
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Where, 
Parameter In context of Real Option In context of Financial Option 
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S 
Present Value of cash flows 
expected from the project 
Stock Price 
Q 
 
Oppurtunity Cost of not Expanding 
(Explained Below) 
Dividend Yield 
T 
Expected Competitive Advantage 
Period/Rights for Expansion 
Time to Expiration 
rf 
Risk free rate of return on 10 year 
GOI bond 
Risk free rate of return 
K Present Value of Capital Costs Strike Price 
σ Volatility of Project Value Volatility of Return on Stock 
 
N(d1) & N(d2) are normal cumulative distributions which gives us the range of the likelihood 
of the real option being viable before expiration date. 
In the context of current project the real option is the option to expand and upgrade their 2G 
systems for the incumbent operators or to expand in a new project for standalone 3G players. 
Basili & Fontini (Basili & Fontini, 2003) mentioned in their paper on the real option 
valuation of 3G license that implementation of technologies like 3G /UMTS are considered 
as segmental process where in the operator has the flexibility to launch new services in a 
sequential and discrete manner. Operator also has the flexibility to start off the rollout by a 
pilot project and then scale up the project according to the need and market response. 
The inputs used in the above model are explained below, 
1. S – Present value of cash flows is calculated from the assumptions explained in the 
previous section and the output from DCF model is used as input in this model. 
2. K – Present value of capital expenditure required to rollout 3G services. This value is 
also explained in the previous section. 
3. q – Oppurtunity cost of waiting and not rolling out 3G services. Though we have 
calculated the cash flows for each year, however it is difficult to predict the exact pattern of 
cash flows which would be lost by waiting to roll out 3G services. To overcome this problem 
we have assumed a dividend yield of 5%. Since useful life of the project is 20 years, 5% of 
the value of the present value of cash flows could be considered as the dividend payments 
which we would not receive in case we don‟t rollout 3G services immediately. The other cost 
of waiting is the loss of market to competition which once lost is difficult to recapture.  
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4. t – This is the time period over which the option should be exercised lest the telecom 
operators will lose competitive edge. On top of that TRAI has set certain rollout obligations 
which involve covering 90% of the metro areas and 50% of DHQs within 5 years of 
allotment of 3G license which effectively translates the expansion of 3G services by a 
company as a series of call options. However we are taking an approximation here that the 
telecom operators need to rollout the 3G services within 5 years.   
5. rf – Risk free rate on 10 year GOI. The yield on 10 year GOI bond is 7.94% in 
March
32
. 
6. σ – Volatility of project is difficult to estimate and theoretically a Monte-Carlo 
analysis needs to be done with all relevant probability distributions of the input variables. 
Since we don‟t have the relevant probability distribution we have used annualized standard 
deviation of returns of Bombay Stock Exchange Technology, Media and Telecom Index 
(BSE TECK) as a proxy which is equal to ~27.5%. 
5 Data & Assumptions 
The data for the purpose of valuation has been taken from public sources and sector 
reports.Data has also been estimated for some of the years by taking assumptions. We will 
now discuss various data points and assumptions. 
5.1 Population& Population Growth Rate 
India‟s population was 1.15 Bn in 200933 and population growth has been declining from 
1.7% in 2000 to 1.3% in 2009
34
. We have safely assumed a population growth rate of 1.5% 
for the next 20 years over the base of 2009 population. The growth rate assumption is also 
justified by the planning commission‟s working paper which projects India‟s population 
growth from 1.51% to 1.39%
35
. 
                                                 
32
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/Economics/Government-Bond-Yield.aspx?Symbol=INR, accessed on 10-
03-2011 
33
http://www.google.com/publicdata, accessed, on 10-03-2011 
34
http://www.google.com/publicdata, accessed on 10-03-2011 
35
planningcommission.nic.in/reports/wrkpapers/wp_hwpaper.pdf, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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5.2 Wireless Subscribers & Wireless Teledensity 
Gartner projects India‟s mobile subscribers to cross 993 Million by the end of 201436. 
According to TRAI, India‟s current subscriber base was 584 Million in 2010. Based on these 
two numbers a constant cumulative growth rate was assumed till end of 2014. India‟s 
Teledensity would reach 78% by the end of 2014.Since Teledensity can‟t go on increasing 
indefinitely as penetration in metros is Category “A” circles have reached above 100% or sub 
100% level. Penetration in rural areas has increased at a rather slow pace because of 
unprofitable business case. Hence an assumption of 90% Teledensity has been taken by the 
end of 2020 which has been kept constant thereafter. Since as per Gartner‟s projections 
growth of wireless subscribers will be around ~11% in the next 4-5 years. A growth of 4%, 
which will take India‟s Teledensity to 90% by the end of 2020, thereafter is not a very 
optimistic assumption. Moreover this assumption doesn‟t hurt our calculations and has been 
shown to give a perspective on wireless growth. 
5.3 3G penetration 
The projections for 3G penetration till the end of 2015 are taken from PWC‟s report titled 
“Mobile Broadband: Outlook 2015”. Though India is a favorable market as far as wireless 
services are concerned, India‟s 3G penetration has been projected to remain low during the 
initial years. Only the early adopters will be adopting it. Issues like availability of handsets, 
3G coverage and rollout needs to be sorted out before a growth can be realized. As per PWC, 
India‟s 3G Teledensity has been assumed to be (PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010), 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
0.01% 0.1% 0.8% 2.1% 4.7% 8.3% 
Figures are as of year end 
Post 2015, India‟s 3G penetrations is expected to rise rapidly as network and rollout issues 
would be sorted out and more affordable handsets would be available. A growth rate of 50% 
has been assumed from 2016 to 2021 such that the 3G Teledensity should reach 60% in 10 
years. The This growth rate doesn‟t look unreasonable given a worldwide developed markets 
3G subscribers‟ growth rate of 41% year on year (Morgan Stanley, 2010). A comparative 
study on the penetration of 3G in other countries is presented in the following two graphics. 
The graphics further adds credence to the assumed growth rate of 3G subscribes. 
                                                 
36
http://www.businessworld.in/bw/2010_07_15_Gartner_Sees_Mobile_Users_At_993_Mn_In_2014.html, 
accessed on 10-03-2011 
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Figure 20 – Rise in 3G Penetration in Developed Countries 
L represents the year of launch 
Source: ICRA(ICRA Limited, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 21 – 3G Penetration in Developed Markets 
Morgan Stanley(Morgan Stanley, 2010) 
From the beginning of 2021 and till the end of 2030 we have assumed a zero growth of 3G 
subscribers. This assumption is a bit naïve; however it is difficult to predict about the 
technology after 10 years from now and moreover assumption is much more plausible than 
2007 2008 2009E 2010E 2011E 2012E 2013E 2014E
Western Europe 79,617 126,724 205,962 299,220 381,422 448,691 499,686 549,615
3G Penetration 17% 25% 39% 54% 67% 77% 85% 92%
Japan 72,690 88,434 101,320 110,823 116,581 120,463 123,217 124,770
3G Penetration 72% 84% 91% 96% 98% 99% 99% 100%
Asia / Pacific (ex. Japan) 50,163 83,514 151,192 295,230 482,981 693,995 918,063 1,135,626
3G Penetration 4% 5% 7% 13% 19% 25% 31% 37%
North America 53,307 83,460 116,575 145,683 177,451 204,835 231,271 260,575
3G Penetration 20% 29% 38% 46% 54% 61% 67% 74%
Eastern Europe 8,785 19,918 40,944 72,321 120,291 139,960 166,288 199,977
3G Penetration 2% 5% 9% 16% 26% 29% 34% 40%
Middle East & Africa 5,781 18,424 50,409 91,085 165,564 239,805 309,251 383,238
3G Penetration 1% 3% 7% 12% 19% 25% 30% 35%
South & Central America 3,126 9,265 21,875 40,448 59,107 80,087 100,027 122,258
3G Penetration 1% 2% 4% 7% 10% 12% 15% 17%
Total 273,469 429,739 688,278 1,054,810 1,503,397 1,927,837 2,347,804 2,776,058
3G Penetration 8% 11% 15% 21% 27% 33% 38% 43%
3G Penetration in Developed Markets
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assuming a continued growth in the second decade of the 3G license. Parallels could be 
drawn between the growth path assumed for 3G and the growth that we have seen in the 2G 
technology. The graphic below displays the growth path of India‟s Urban and Rural 
Teledensity over the last decade. 
 
Figure 22 – Teledensity in India (Urban Vs. Rural) 
Source: TRAI 
Growth in the urban areas really picked up in 2003 when Reliance entered the industry and 
with it came down the ownership price of the mobile. A series of factors including policy 
changes by government and entry of new players, innovative pricing schemes and handset 
subsidies propelled India‟s Teledensity to around ~60% by the end of 2010 from 4.3% in 
2003. 
5.4 Revenue Projections 
To calculate future revenues and cash-flows it becomes important for us to look at the drivers 
of the revenue. In telecommunication industry the important metrics which are looked at are 
the number of subscribers and the average revenue per user (ARPU).  
                                   
If we further bifurcate this formula into number of mobile subscribers and number of 
broadband subscribers and then further bifurcate the number of mobile subscribers into 
number of prepaid subscribers and number of postpaid subscribers then we get the following 
equation, 
2.9 3.6 4.3 5.1 
7.04 9.08 
12.86 
18.23 
26.22 
36.98 
52.74 
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Now we have six variables to forecast on the basis of above equation. We will look into them 
one by one. 
5.5 3G Mobile-Broadband Subscribers Ratio 
To project the ratio of the number of mobile
37
 and broadband subscribers‟38 two main inputs 
have been taken which are as follows, 
1. Technological Constraint –Voice and Data Capacity of a 3G site shall play a key 
role in determining the capacity of a Base site and hence the number of subscribers for 
broadband and mobile services. 3G deployment is anticipated to be voice focused because of 
reasons like shortage of spectrum for voice subscribers and limited data availability even if a 
bandwidth of 256 Kbps is considered per subscriber with an assumed contention ratio of 
1:10. There has been a crunch of spectrum in some of the circles where the operators are 
using the spectrum for 2.5 G technologies to be used for voice subscribers and hence voice 
centric deployment could be the focus of the telecom companies in the initial years. 
Operators might transfer their premium subscribers to 3G networks with better capacity in 
order to deliver an enhanced user experience and acknowledge the loyalty of their premium 
subscribers especially with Mobile Number Portability in the offing for the subscribers. 
Following graphic compares 2G and 3G base sites. The data has been taken from a report by 
a joint report prepared by FICCI and consulting firm BDA (BDA Connect & FICCI, 2009). 
 
                                                 
37
 Mobile Subscriber has been considered as a subscriber who will be using a Mobile Phone to access 3G 
network.  
38
 Broadband Subscribers has been considered as a subscriber who will be using a data card or a USB modem to 
access 3G network 
Valuation of 3G Spectrum License In India: A Real Options Approach 2011 
 
52 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 23 – Comparison of Capacity of 3G Vs. 2G Base Sites 
Source: BDA (BDA Connect & FICCI, 2009) 
Total 2G Site Capacity - 40 Erlang 
 Voice usage for 1100 Subscribers @ 0.035 Erlang per Subscriber 
    Total 3G Site Capacity - 135 Erlang39 
 Voice usage for 1100 Subscribers @ 0.055 Erlang per Subscriber 
250 Data Users @ 256 Kbps (Assumed Contention Ratio 1:10) 
 
Figure 24 – Capacity of 2G & 3G Base Sites 
Source: BDA(BDA Connect & FICCI, 2009) 
250 users for data and 1100 subscribers for voice give us an approximate base case ratio of 
broadband and total 3G subscribers to be around ~18.5%. 
2. Projections made by BDA & FICCI – The projections made by BDA & FICCI 
(BDA Connect & FICCI, 2009) are represented in the graphic below. While preparing the 
report BDA had assumed that the license shall be allocated to operators by mid of 2009, 
however licenses were allocated to operators only by Sep‟2010. Hence we can shift the 
projections given in the graph below by 1 year. If we look at the number of modem 
broadband subscribers as percentage to total 3G subscribers it comes around to be an average 
value of 24%.  
                                                 
39
 Erlang is a unit which measures the capacity of a wireless channel and is used commonly in Wireless industry 
parlance 
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Figure 25 – Proportion of Broadband among 3G Subscribers (Projections) 
Source: BDA(BDA Connect & FICCI, 2009) 
 
 
Figure 26 – Split of 3G Subscribers 
Source: BDA (BDA Connect & FICCI, 2009) 
As a base case an assumed penetration of 20% for broadband subscribers among the total 3G 
subscribers is taken and which has been kept constant throughout. The percentage is not 
optimistic by any means as ARPU of broadband subscriber would be higher than the ARPU 
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of mobile subscriber and is also in line with the technological constraint.A sensitivity analysis 
has been done on this value after the DCF valuation to show its effect on the DCF.  
5.6 3G Prepaid-Postpaid Split (Mobile Services) 
As far 2G is concerned India is a heavily skewed telecom market as far as prepaid and 
postpaid mobile subscribers are concerned. The graphic below shows the postpaid and 
prepaid subscriber growth and proportion of Postpaid Subscribers in the total wireless 
subscribers. 
 
Figure 27 – Number of Postpaid & Prepaid Subscribers in India 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
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Figure 28 – Proportion of Postpaid Subscribers among Total Mobile Subscribers in India 
Source: CMIA Database (TRAI) 
Proportion of postpaid subscribers has been around 5% since the last couple years and as can 
be seen from the exponential trend line it will go down but should stabilize around 4% to 5%. 
PWC projects the following split between prepaid and postpaid subscribers, 
 
Figure 29 – Projections for proportion of prepaid and postpaid subscribers among total mobile subscribers 
Source: PWC (PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010) 
PWC in its report has provided the projections from the end of 2011 to end of 2015 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010). We have extrapolated those projections on both sides 
to assume that at the end of 2010 100% of 3G mobile subscribers would postpaid subscribers 
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and by the end of 2016 only 10% of the 3G subscribers would be postpaid and by the end of 
2020 only 5% of the 3G mobile subscribers are assumed to be postpaid. The assumptions are 
in line with the trend observed in the 2G technology. The propensity of the telecom operators 
to switch their premium mobile subscribers (Postpaid Subscribers) to 3G technology and start 
the rollout of the 3G technology in the Metro and Category „A‟ circles adds credence to the 
above assumption. 
5.7 2G ARPU Projections 
2G ARPU in India has fallen at a rate of -24% CAGR in the last 3 years since 2007. Since we 
have bifurcated ARPU into prepaid ARPU and postpaid ARPU we will consider them 
independently. In the same period of 3 years prepaid ARPU has fallen by ~-23.7% CAGR 
and postpaid ARPU has fallen by ~-5.5%. A graphical representation of the fall in the 
ARPUs is given in the following figure.  
 
Figure 30 – 2G Prepaid & Postpaid ARPU in India 
Source: CMIE Database (TRAI) 
In the figure above the trend lines for ARPUs indicate that ARPU will go down further. A 
similar assumption with some modification has been used here such that Postpaid ARPU will 
decrease by -5% during the year 2010 based on the historical CAGR and Prepaid ARPU will 
decrease by -20% during the year 2010 based on the historical CAGR. The rate of decline of 
ARPU is going to decrease in future as the industry is facing hyper competition and there will 
be some consolidation in the near future thus stabilizing the fall in the 2G ARPU. The shape 
that has been assumed for the 2G ARPU in future is as follows, 
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Figure 31 – Projections for 2G Prepaid & Postpaid ARPU in India 
The assumption here is that 2G ARPUs will continue to fall till end of 2015 and after that 
ARPUs will stabilize. The argument of consolidation because of hyper-competition gains 
credence from the view of industry experts
40. India‟s tariff is among the lowest in the world 
and on top of that operators entered into price war in the last few years and in the process 
dragged India‟s tariffs into an abyss. In order to win customers new operators cut their prices 
thus forcing the incumbent operators to cut their prices too in order to remain competitive
41
. 
For incumbent operators this becomes more important as their Quality of Service levels are 
expected to be low than the incumbent operators because their bandwidths are already 
running to full capacity and there is a spectrum shortage especially in Metro and Category 
„A‟ circles. Nonetheless an assumption has been taken regarding the future shape of the 2G 
ARPU. A sensitivity analysis could be done later to see how NPV will be affected by a 
deviation of the expected 2G ARPU. 
5.8 3G Mobile Handset ARPU 
According to PWC a premium of 15-35% is expected on the 2G 
ARPU(PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010). Globally 3G ARPUs are more than 2G ARPUs 
because of increased use of VAS and other applications. In the telecom parlance a term 
“Killer Application” is used to describe an application which gets the user hooked on to the 
network and thus increase the revenues for the mobile operator. In Japan NTT DoCoMo 
                                                 
40
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-04-15/news/27619761_1_new-customers-sims-tariffs, 
accessed on 10-03-2011 
41
http://www.business-standard.com/india/news/indian-telecom-space-to-witness-consolidation-
macquarie/13/55/75375 on, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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enjoyed a 58% premium on 2G ARPU from its 3G subscribers (ICRA Limited, 2009). As a 
base case we have taken 25% premium on 2G ARPU. We have kept it constant throughout 
the duration of the project as it is difficult to estimate the premium. Instead we will later do a 
sensitivity analysis to see how a variation from our base case assumption shall affect the NPV 
of the project.  
5.9 Modem-Broadband ARPU 
ARPU for mobile broadband ARPU is around INR 700
42
. Penetration of broadband is very 
low in India and so far the industry hasn‟t seen a price war in this segment and hence Mobile 
broadband ARPU is not expected to decrease in the near future. The report by BDA & FICC 
also considers a minor decline in 3G modem ARPU from 14.1 USD in 2009 to 13.3 USD by 
the end of 2013 which gives us a rate of -1.45% CAGR. They consider a 2009 rollout. We 
have used a -1.5% drop annually till the end of 2020 and then the ARPU is kept constant in 
the next decade. 
5.10 Blended 3G ARPU 
The blended ARPU as calculated from the above projections declines from INR 600 at the 
end of 2010 to INR 273 at the end of 2015 which is in line with the ARPU projections given 
by PWC. The decline in 3G ARPU will be because of two reasons, 
a. Competitive Pressure will result in decline in tariffs. 
b. Addition of low ARPU prepaid subscribers. 
In environment of declining ARPU it becomes important for telecom operators to partner 
with application developers, content providers and device manufactures to give an enhanced 
user experience to customer to charge a premium on the 3G services. 
5.11 Revenue Composition of 3G Mobile ARPU 
In India data constitutes only ~9-10% of the mobile ARPU. The primary reason is lack of 
available bandwidth and devices which reduces customer satisfaction from these services. 
With the rollout of 3G the share of data in mobile ARPU should go up from the current ~11-
12% to 25%(PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010). Though this doesn‟t harm our valuation 
but it is the base assumption by which public sources have predicted a 25% premium for 3G 
on 2G ARPU. A liner increase is considered between 2010 and 2015 such that data revenues 
                                                 
42
http://www.bsnlevdo.in/bsnl-evdo-news/mts-to-offer-14-7-mbps-speeds-through-cdma-dongles, accessed on 
10-03-2011 
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from mobile services shall reach 24% by the end of 2015 and it has been kept at 25% for the 
rest of the life of the license/project. The assumption seems consistent when compared with 
the trend that proportion of data revenue of the total service revenue has seen by other 
operators in other countries. 
 
Figure 32 – Premium of 3G over 2G for some of the operators in Developed Nations 
Source: ICRA (ICRA Limited, 2009) 
5.12 Operator’s share in Data ARPU 
The value chain of broadband and data which is provided over mobile handset typically has 4 
players, 
1. Device Provider – This is the manufacturer of the mobile phone and other access 
devices. 
2. Application Provider – These are the software vendors, game and application 
developers. 
3. Content Provider – They provide the content which the application uses.  
4. Channel Provider – This is the telecom operator which facilitates and provides 
channel or bandwidth.  
To put this into context we‟ll take the example of XYZ mobile company which is giving a 
“Bloomberg Live Market Update Software” bundled with its phone. In this case, 
1. Device provider is the XYZ mobile company. 
2. Bloomberg is the content provider. 
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3. Application developer is the software vendor which has given license to XYZ mobile 
company to bundle the software with its phone. 
4. Channel Provider is the telecom operator which provides the required bandwidth. 
Currently the share of data revenue is heavily skewed towards the telecom operators because 
of the limited uptake of data services in India for reasons mentioned before. Operator‟s share 
of the total data service revenue is expected to go down from the current 70-75% to 63-67% 
by the end of 2015 (PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 2010). This is bound to happen as when 
data services will uptake in the country supported by 3G rollout. We have considered a 
decline from 72.5% to 65% from end of 2010 to end of 2015 respectively and from 2016 to 
2030 we have kept it constant at 65%. 
5.13 Capital Expenditure 
Capital expenditure is Indian telecom industry can be broadly divided into two segments, 
1. Investment in Passive Infrastructure – Investment in passive infrastructure is not done 
by telecom companies instead there are separate companies like Reliance Infratel and Indus 
Towers who create passive infrastructure and then rent it out to various telecom companies.  
2. Investment in Active Infrastructure – Telecom companies have to install their Base 
Transceiver Stations (BTS) to rollout 3G services. The number of BTS installed during the 
rollout phase shall determine our Capital Expenditure. 
For estimating the capital expenditure following methodology has been used, 
a. As per our projections which are shown in the appendix 3G users should reach 815 
million by the end of 2020. 
b. We have assumed that each BTS can support up to 1350 Subscribers (1100 Voice and 
250 Broadband @256 Kbps) as discussed before. 
c. The above two assumptions gives us a figure of around 6 Lakh BTS which needs to 
be installed throughout the country in order to rollout 3G services. 
d. The capital cost per BTS is USD 10000-12000 equivalent to INR 495000. 
e. Points 4 & 5 give us an investment of INR 300 Billion in BTS. 
f. We have taken an upfront investment of INR 400 Billion for rollout of 3G services. 
Since an exact schedule of capital expenditure is difficult to approximate we have 
assumed that this investment will be made upfront. This will give us a pessimistic 
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valuation however it is better than splitting the investment in equal installments or as 
per the growth of the subscribers. 
The assumption taken is line with PWC analysis which projects a cumulative investment of 
INR 380 Billion by 2015 for the rollout of 3G services (PricewaterhouseCoopers India, 
2010).  
5.14 Operating Expenditure 
The projections for operating expenditure have been taken from a report prepared by FICCI-
BDA in which they had given the industry wide cost structure with various heads (BDA 
Connect & FICCI, 2009). We have taken the values as they are except for few changes which 
are discussed below. The assumptions that we have taken for operating expenditure along 
with their cost drivers are given in Table 5, 
Table 5 – Operating Cost Structure in Telecommunications Industry in India 
Net Interconnection Charges as % of Gross Revenues   20% 
Expenses as % of Net Revenue 
Network Operating Expenses   15% 
Sales & Distribution Expenses   7% 
IT Expenses   2% 
Service Expenses   3% 
Billing, Collection and Bad Debt   2% 
Marketing Expenses   3% 
Personnel Administration   5% 
Total Operating Expenses   37% 
Spectrum Usage Charge as % of AGR   3% 
EBITDA as % of Net Revenue   58% 
EBITDA as % of Gross Revenue   46% 
 
Source: BDA(BDA Connect & FICCI, 2009) 
The only change made is that in spectrum usage charge which has been set as 4% as per 
Department of Technology, GOI guidelines (DOT, GOI, 2010). 
5.15 Financing of Capital Expenditure and License Fees 
License Fees is the aggregate fees paid by all the operators for acquiring 3G licenses which is 
equal to INR 677190 Million (INR 677.2 Billion) and capital expenditure has been assumed 
to be upfront and equal to INR 400 Billion as per our calculations and on the basis of reports. 
For financing we have assumed a debt equity ratio of 1. A Sensitivity analysis has been done 
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on this assumption to see its effect on NPV. For the purpose of valuation we have kept 
financing separate from the project and have assumed that the industry will tend to maintain 
the debt and equity in the same ratio. The debt equity ratio is taken as the average debt equity 
ratio of 3 telecom operators for the last 5 years as shown inTable 6 
Table 6 – Average Debt Equity Ratio of Telecom Operators 
Debt Equity Ratio 
Company  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Average 
Bharti Airtel 0.65 0.47 0.33 0.28 0.14 0.374 
Idea Cellular 4.96 1.95 1.84 0.67 0.57 1.998 
Reliance Communications NA  0.71 0.82 0.6 0.48 0.6525 
Average           1.00 
 
Source: Moneycontrol
43
 
5.16 Depreciation & Amortization 
For depreciation of capital expenditure and amortization of license fees a period of 15 years 
has been considered and straight line method has been assumed. 
5.17 Cost of Capital 
Weighted average cost of capital is calculated using the following formula, 
                       
Where, 
   – Cost of Equity (Calculated from CAPM) 
   – Cost of Debt (Assumed to be 9%)
44
 
   – Weight of Equity in Capital Structure 
   – Weight of Debt in Capital Structure 
T – Tax Rate (Assumed to be 30%) 
                                                 
43
http://www.moneycontrol.com, accessed on 10-03-2011 
44
http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-05-25/news/27573892_1_bharti-airtel-3g-third-generation-
mobile-spectrum, accessed on 10-03-2011 
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For calculating Cost of Equity, Market Return on Nifty is calculated in 2010 CY. Risk free 
rate of return is considered as yield on 10 Year GOI bonds which is 7.94% in March. These 
values have then been substituted in Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), 
                
Where, 
  – This is measure of systematic risk of the project. 
   – Risk free rate of return 
   – Rate of return on market 
For calculating   two methods have been considered, 
1. Median beta of telecom companies has been taken. 
2. Beta of a portfolio of stocks of telecom companies have been taken with weights of 
each stock being equal to their weight in the combined market capitalization. 
The two methods are illustrated in Table 7, 
Table 7 – Calculation of Beta 
Company (Stock) Beta Market Capitalization (Crore) Weight in Portfolio 
Bharti Airtel 0.73 122489 72% 
Idea Cellular 1.06 20031 12% 
Reliance Communications 1.52 18976 11% 
MTNL 1.17 2753 2% 
TATA Communications 0.53 6022 4% 
Median Beta 1.06 
  Portfolio Beta 0.86     
Sector Beta 0.54   
 
The highest value of 1.06 has been taken for the base case valuation. A sensitivity analysis 
has been done on NPV by changing the WACC to see how much NPV is affected by 
variations in the assumption of WACC. WACC calculations are shown in Table 8, 
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Table 8 – Cost of Capital Calculations 
Debt-Equity Ratio 1 
Weight of Debt 0.50 
Weight of Equity 0.50 
Cost of Debt 9% 
Tax Rate 30% 
Effective Cost of Debt 6% 
    
Return on Nifty   
Monday, January 04, 2010 5232.2 
Friday, December 31, 2010 6134.5 
Return 17.25% 
    
Cost of Equity Calculations   
Risk Free Rate on 10 Year GOI 
Bond 7.94% 
Market Return on Nifty in 2010 CY 17% 
Beta 1.06 
Cost of Equity 17.80% 
    
Cost of Capital 12.05% 
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6 Results& Findings 
In this chapter first the base case DCF valuation results are presented along with the 
sensitivity analysis of key variables on the basis of Chapter 4 & 5. After the DCF valuation 
we have given the projections for revenue from 3G Data & Voice Services. An incremental 
revenue analysis has also been given for the 3G operators. Following that real option value of 
the license has been given which is calculated on the basis of Chapter 4 & 5. 
6.1 NPV & IRR 
The NPV of the project after deducting the license and capital expenditure comes out to be 
291 Billion and IRR comes out to be 14.24%. The DCF model is presented inFigure 36 in 
Appendix. 
Table 9 – Base Case NPV & IRR 
NPV (Bn) 291 
IRR 14.24% 
Since these are the base case values we would now try to vary some of the key input variables 
in the DCF model to see their effect on NPV. The variables that we would vary and their 
effect on NPV is presented in the following sections, 
1. Beta and Premium of 3G Services over 2G Services – Since we calculated a range 
of beta values in the previous section we would vary beta from 0.54 which is the sector beta 
to 1.2 which is more than the highest value of beta which we calculated. As far as the 
premium is considered we would vary it from the 15% which is the pessimistic scenario to 
50% which operators could charge based on the international experience of operators in other 
countries. 
Table 10 – Sensitivity Analysis of NPV vs. Beta & Premium of 3G over 2G 
Sensitivity Analysis 
NPV (Bn)291 
Beta 
0.5 0.7 0.9 1.0 1.2 
Premium of 
3G over 2G 
20% 695 548 423 309 173 
25% 727 577 450 334 196 
30% 759 607 477 360 218 
35% 791 636 505 385 241 
40% 823 666 532 410 264 
45% 856 695 559 435 287 
50% 888 725 586 460 309 
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As far as Premium of 3G over 2G and Beta is concerned NPV is pretty robust with the 
variation in these assumptions and is greater than zero. The results are presented in Table 10. 
2. Proportion of Broadband 
Subscribers in Total 3G Subscribers and Cost of Capital – Proportion of 3G 
subscribers sis varied from 18% which was calculated from the technological constraints 
by 3GPP simulations to 30%,an extreme case considering the capacity of a 3G site and the 
current bandwidth crunch in the 2G technology. We see that with our base case 
assumption of 22% proportion of broadband subscribers in total 3G subscribers NPV 
becomes zero between 14% and 15% Cost of Capital which is consistent with our IRR. On 
the other hand a 30% proportion of broadband subscribers increase our NPV tremendously 
which is logically consistent with the fact that ARPU of Broadband is around 700 which is 
much higher than the ARPU of mobile services.This suggests that 3G broadband will play 
a critical role in the future as far as operators‟ returns are concerned. The results are 
presented in Table 11, 
Table 11 – Sensitivity Analysis of NPV vs. Proportion of Broadband Subs in Total 3G Subs & Cost of Capital 
  
Sensitivity Analysis 
NPV (Bn) 
Proportion of Broadband Subs in Total 3G Subs 
18% 22% 26% 30% 
Cost of 
Capital 
10% 540 651 762 874 
11% 365 463 562 661 
12% 211 299 387 474 
13% 77 155 233 311 
14% -41 28 98 168 
15% -145 -83 -20 42 
16% -237 -181 -125 -69 
 
3. EBITDA Margin – EBITDA Margin has been taken as 46.4% in the base case. 
While doing sensitivity analysis it has been varied from 40% to 52% and the results are 
presented in Table 12. From the results we see that NPV is pretty robust vis-à-vis the 
EBITDA margin. Though our base case suggests that EBITDA should be around 46.4% 
however considering that the technology is new, there would be added promotional and 
advertising expenditure in the short term coupled with the subsidies that the operators are 
expected to provide on wireless broadband devices to push the adoption of 3G technologies. 
These issues are adequately taken care of by the sensitivity analysis on EBITDA margin. 
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Table 12 Sensitivity Analysis of NPV vs. EBITDA Margin 
Sensitivity Analysis 
NPV (Bn) 
EBITDA Margin (As % of Gross Revenue) 
40% 42% 44% 46% 48% 50% 52% 
NPV (Bn) 116 171 226 280 334 389 443 
 
6.2 Revenue Projections 
3G Services are expected to generate INR 273 Billion in revenues by the end of year 2015. 
Out of this INR 100 Billion will come from voice revenue and INR 173 Billion from data 
services including broadband services. 3G Broadband Revenue is expected to touch INR 90 
Billion by the end of 2015.  
 
Figure 33 – Revenues from 3G Services 
  
6.3 Incremental Revenues for 3G Operators 
Though rollout of 3G technology would cannibalize the 2G technology for the incumbent 
operators the incremental revenues would be positive which would be equal to the premium 
that the operators would charge on 3G on account of the increased data usage driven by high 
speed applications, better network performance and enhanced user experience. The 
incremental data and voice revenues for 3G operators are presented in Figure 34, 
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Figure 34 – Incremental Revenues from 3G Services for 3G Operators 
6.4 Real Option Valuation of 3G License 
As per the methodology described in Chapter 4, the key variables which are required as an 
input were calculated and shown in Table 13, 
Table 13 – Inputs Required for Black Scholes Model 
S (Bn) 136 
K (Bn) 400 
rf 7.94% 
Q 5% 
t (years) 5 
σ 27.5% 
 
Table 14 – Output from Black Scholes Model 
D1 2.546349886 
D2 1.931431192 
N(D1) 99.46% 
N(D2) 97.33% 
License Value (Bn) 798 
 
The value of the license calculated using Black Scholes Model is analogous to the value of a 
European Call. However, the telecom operators to a certain extent are free to exercise their 
option of rolling out the services whenever they deem fit, which is analogous to an American 
Call Option whose value will be always be greater than European Call. Hence value obtained 
here is the lower bound of the license value. The value of the aggregate 3G license calculated 
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using Real Options Methodology is INR 798 Billion which is within 17.8% more than what 
the operators have paid to the government to acquire the rights to rollout 3G services. The 
operators have paid INR 677 Billion to the government for acquiring rights for 3G services. 
In Table 15 sensitivity analysis of License value is presented by varying the Capital 
Expenditure which would be required for rolling out the 3G services and the time to 
expiration. The analysis is, 
1. As the capital expenditure increases the value of the license decreases for the telecom 
operators and as we increase the time to expiration we observe that loss of value due to 
waiting is greater than the value which is added by the option.  
2. The license loses its value as time to expiration increases because if we look at the 3G 
telecom scenario in India there are around 4-5 telecom operators vouching to offer 3G 
services in every circle.  
3. Now as an operator decides to wait competitors will enter the market and the operator 
will lose its competitive edge.  
4. If we compare this scenario to a financial stock option then by waiting to exercise the 
option we lose the dividend payments from the stock and before each dividend payment date 
the option holder should check if the cost of losing the dividend is greater than the benefit of 
benefit of waiting to exercise the option. 
5. Similarly an operator should weigh its cost of waiting by not availing the cash flows 
from subscribers who are willing to adopt the new technology with the benefits of waiting to 
expand and scale up its operations. 
Table 15 – Sensitivity Analysis of License Value vs. Time to Expiration & Present Value of Capex 
Sensitivity Analysis of     
License Value (Bn) 
Time to Expiration (Years) 
5 6 7 8 9 
Capex 
(Bn) 
360 824 791 760 729 699 
400 798 767 738 709 681 
440 772 744 716 689 663 
480 746 720 695 670 646 
520 721 697 674 651 629 
560 696 675 654 633 612 
 
On the whole it looks like as if the firms evaluated the project carefully before entering the 
auctions and placing their bids.This observation looks credential when looked at in 
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combination with TRAI‟s rollout obligations. In Figure 35 – Option Value with Change in 
Volatilitya sensitivity analysis of the option value is presented vis-à-vis volatility of assets. 
 
Figure 35 – Option Value with Change in Volatility 
Increase in volatility adds value to the license as increase in volatility increases the value of 
managerial flexibility, thus increasing the value of the option. 
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7 Conclusions & Recommendations 
The motivation behind this research was to find the intrinsic and option value of the licenses 
which many believed were overvalued. There is often debate on the topic that auctions don‟t 
maximize the overall surplus. Overall surplus is maximized when the transaction price is 
determined by the market on the basis of the perceived worth of the underlying which in turn 
is governed by the demand and supply forces. In this research it was found that the real 
option value of the license in the base case is 798 Billion and is ~17.28% higher than the 
aggregate value paid by the winners of the auction. Hence according to base case real option 
analysis the auctions didn‟t overvalue the license.  
If we assume an Internal rate of return of 15% for the telecom operators then the aggregate 
license value comes out to be ~INR 594 Billion which is ~12% lower than what the operators 
have paid to acquire the license. Hence we see that DCF valuation suggests that the licenses 
were overvalued while Real Options methodology suggests that the licenses were 
undervalued. In other words we can say that Real option analysis has allowed us to look at 
the option value embedded in the 3G spectrum licenses.  
The higher value using the real option methodology could be explained due to the nature of 
the technology itself. Rollout of 3G technology could be considered as a modular process 
where in the modularity could be present in the following aspects, 
1. Operators could implement and “wait and see” strategy wherein they could learn from 
the mistakes of the other operators or they could wait for the time when the prices of the 3G 
devices are low enough so that it is affordable for a wide stratum of the society or they could 
wait till the time when users are more willing to adopt data services or wait for application 
developers to develop the killer application for making the subscribers hooked on to their 
network. 
2. Operators could rollout 3G services as a pilot project in some areas and then on the 
basis of the success of these rollouts it might decide to rollout in other areas as well. 
3. Operators could implement modularity in terms of the types of applications and 
services that operators might want to launch. For ex – Operators might start with the launch 
of entertainment services like Games and then they might decide to launch email and other 
corporate services. 
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This flexibility in the hands of the managers is not adequately represented with a DCF 
analysis where in the timing of the investment should be known/predicted beforehand. 
However such kind of information and knowledge is rarely available at the time of planning 
and moreover in projects with high degree of uncertainty and with irreversible investments. 
Real options analysis adequately captures this flexibility and hence it results in higher 
valuation for the aggregate 3G licenses. 
However the operators should weigh the positive and negative aspects of the flexibility to 
wait to launch 3G services as by not rolling the operator would lose the market to the 
competition and will also have to bear to oppurtunity costs of the lost cash flows. The license 
loses its value as time to expiration increases because if we look at the 3G telecom scenario 
in India there are around 4-5 telecom operators vouching to offer 3G services in every circle. 
Now as an operator decides to wait competitors will enter the market and the operator will 
lose its competitive edge. The discussion is intuitive and could be easily put in perspective by 
taking the analogy of a financial stock option where the holder of the option bears the 
oppurtunity cost of the lost dividends. 
The other motivation of valuing aggregate 3G licenses was to look at the attractiveness of the 
investment in 3G licenses. On the face of it and as per the financial and sensitivity analysis, 
investment in 3G licenses looks a good investment however operators could face certain 
challenges. 
The attractiveness of the investment depends on the uptake of 3G broadband services as seen 
from the sensitivity analysis wherein we vary the proportion of broadband subscribers in the 
total 3G subscribers. However for the uptake of 3G broadband services there are certain 
impediments and preconditions which are as follows, 
1. Availability of utility and content in vernacular language (PricewaterhouseCoopers 
India, 2010). 3G broadband has huge positives for business user as it provides them mobility 
but the real impetus to 3G growth can come from rural India where it is needed most in the 
form of applications like telemedicine, m-banking, m-governance, m-education etc. However 
for 3G broadband to flouring in rural India content and applications should be developed in 
local vernacular languages for early adoption. 
2. Bandwidth offered in India is 2X5 MHz which is less when compared to bandwidth 
offered in other countries for 3G spectrum. This restricts the speed of the network and might 
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affect the takeoff of data intensive applications like video streaming and mobile television. In 
order to provide these services the operators need to incur additional capital expenditure to 
reduce the cell size which again leaves us the operators with a question of cost vs. benefit. 
3. Last but not the least handset and access devices‟ affordability will play a key role in 
determining the growth of 3G services. 
The other challenge that the operators might face in the short run is that of reduced EBITDA 
margin because of subsidies on handsets and heavy promotional and advertising costs. 
Operators will also have to bear high interest payments with low payoffs from the project in 
the short term and hence their ability to raise additional debt might get affected.  
Given the current crunch of bandwidth in the 2G spectrum and with the introduction of 
Mobile Number Portability operators might transfer their premium subscribers onto 3G 
spectrum, however operators should not divert their focus from pushing the 3G broadband 
services as that is where the growth lies. With an abysmal broadband penetration the scope 
for growth is humongous. Though there is a risk of 4G technology offering better speed and 
bandwidth we believe that there is enough space for both the technologies to grow and co-
exist in a symbiotic manner. Since the access devices for 3G technology are relatively cheap 
as compared to 4G because of their economies of scale advantage (3G technology has been 
around since a decade) they could be used to provide mobile broadband solutions to business 
users, home users and in villages. 4G technology on the other hand is relatively new and the 
access devices are expensive they could be used to target the enterprise broadband solutions. 
All said and done we believe that 3G is a good investment however operators have to act in a 
strategic manner to realize its potential. 
We also recommend that in future while allocating telecom licenses or licenses in sectors 
where high and irreversible investment is required and there is a scope for the licensees to 
invest in phases or in modules, the government should consider real options methodology for 
setting the price of the license, or the base price of the licenses in case the government 
decides to follow an auction methodology to allocate the licenses to determine a more 
accurate price of the license which takes into account the managerial flexibility.  
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9 Appendix 
9.1 DCF Model 
 
Figure 36 – DCF Model (2010 – 2016) 
 
Year (Start of the Year) 2010 (A) 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Population (Bn) 1.2 1.22 1.24 1.25 1.27 1.29
Wireless Subscribers
Total Wireless Subscribers (Mn) 584 649 722 803 893 993 1032
Wireless Teledensity 54% 59% 65% 71% 78% 80%
Net Additions (Mn) 73 81 90 100 39
3G Subscribers
3G Penetration 0.01% 0.10% 1% 2% 5% 8%
Total 3G Subscribers (Mn) 0.12 1.22 10 26 60 107
3G Mobile Subs (Mn) 0.09 0.95 8 21 47 84
3G Postpaid Subs (Mn) 0.09 0.86 4 8 12 17
3G Prepaid Subs (Mn) 0.00 0.10 4 12 35 67
3G Modem Subs (Mn) 0.03 0.27 2 6 13 24
ARPU Projections (Handsets)
2G Postpaid ARPU 481 457 439 426 417 413 413
2G Prepaid ARPU 101 81 73 69 67 67 67
3G ARPU 571 503 309 259 191 170
ARPU Projections (Broadband)
3G Broadband ARPU 700 690 679 669 659 649 639
ARPU Projections (Blended)
3G Blended ARPU (Handsets + Modems) 597 541 388 347 292 273
Revenue from 3G (Mn)
Total Revenue 3G 430 4347 25879 75454 151073 273839
Revenue Split (Mobile Service Provider)
Voice Revenue (Mn) 285 2719 13467 35673 60688 100909
Mobile Data Revenue (Mn) 26 304 1809 5616 10988 20713
Broadband Revenue (Mn) 79 852 6817 21435 49118 91692
Total Data Revenue (Mn) 105 1156 8627 27052 60106 112405
Gross Revenue (Mn) 390 3875 22093 62724 120794 213313
Net Interconnection Charges 78 775 4,419 12,545 24,159 42,663
Net Revenue 312 3100 17675 50179 96636 170651
EBITDA (Mn) 181 1798 10251 29104 56049 98977
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813
EBIT (Mn) -120105 -118488 -110035 -91182 -64238 -21309
Tax @ 30% 0 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income (Mn) -120105 -118488 -110035 -91182 -64238 -21309
Add
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813
Free Cash Flow (Mn) -1077189.5 181 1798 10251 29104 56049 98977
NPV (Bn) 291
IRR 14.24%
Debt Schedule
Debt Remaining 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization Schedule
Years 15
Asset Remaining 1077189.5 1005377 933564 861752 789939 718126 646314
Depreciaiton 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813
DCF Model 3G License Valuation
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Figure 37 – DCF Model (2017 – 2023) 
Year (Start of the Year) 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Population (Bn) 1.31 1.33 1.35 1.37 1.39 1.41 1.43
Wireless Subscribers
Total Wireless Subscribers (Mn) 1073 1116 1160 1206 1253 1272 1291
Wireless Teledensity 82% 84% 86% 88% 90% 90% 90%
Net Additions (Mn) 41 42 44 46 48 19 19
3G Subscribers
3G Penetration 12% 18% 27% 40% 59% 58% 57%
Total 3G Subscribers (Mn) 161 241 362 543 815 815 815
3G Mobile Subs (Mn) 126 188 282 424 636 636 636
3G Postpaid Subs (Mn) 13 16 21 26 32 32 32
3G Prepaid Subs (Mn) 113 172 261 397 604 604 604
3G Modem Subs (Mn) 35 53 80 120 179 179 179
ARPU Projections (Handsets)
2G Postpaid ARPU 413 413 413 413 413 413 413
2G Prepaid ARPU 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
3G ARPU 126 121 116 110 105 105 105
ARPU Projections (Broadband)
3G Broadband ARPU 630 620 611 602 593 593 593
ARPU Projections (Blended)
3G Blended ARPU (Handsets + Modems) 237 231 225 218 212 212 212
Revenue from 3G (Mn)
Total Revenue 3G 381696 557338 813310 1186086 1728557 2074269 2074269
Revenue Split (Mobile Service Provider)
Voice Revenue (Mn) 119041 170920 244916 350179 499477 599372 599372
Mobile Data Revenue (Mn) 25792 37033 53065 75872 108220 129864 129864
Broadband Revenue (Mn) 144933 214139 316391 467467 690683 828819 828819
Total Data Revenue (Mn) 170726 251172 369456 543339 798902 958683 958683
Gross Revenue (Mn) 289767 422092 614372 893519 1298379 1558055 1558055
Net Interconnection Charges 57,953 84,418 122,874 178,704 259,676 311,611 311,611
Net Revenue 231814 337673 491498 714815 1038703 1246444 1246444
EBITDA (Mn) 134452 195850 285069 414593 602448 722937 722937
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813
EBIT (Mn) 14166 75564 164783 294307 482162 602651 602651
Tax @ 30% 4250 22669 49435 88292 144649 180795 180795
Net Income (Mn) 9916 52895 115348 206015 337513 421856 421856
Add
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813
Free Cash Flow (Mn) 130202 173181 235634 326301 457799 542142 542142
NPV (Bn)
IRR
Debt Schedule
Debt Remaining 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization Schedule
Years
Asset Remaining 574501 502688 430876 359063 287251 215438 143625
Depreciaiton 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813 71813
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Figure 38 – DCF Model (2024 – 2030) 
 
Year (Start of the Year) 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Population (Bn) 1.46 1.48 1.50 1.52 1.55 1.57 1.59
Wireless Subscribers
Total Wireless Subscribers (Mn) 1311 1330 1350 1371 1391 1412 1433
Wireless Teledensity 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90% 90%
Net Additions (Mn) 19 20 20 20 21 21 21
3G Subscribers
3G Penetration 56% 55% 54% 54% 53% 52% 51%
Total 3G Subscribers (Mn) 815 815 815 815 815 815 815
3G Mobile Subs (Mn) 636 636 636 636 636 636 636
3G Postpaid Subs (Mn) 32 32 32 32 32 32 32
3G Prepaid Subs (Mn) 604 604 604 604 604 604 604
3G Modem Subs (Mn) 179 179 179 179 179 179 179
ARPU Projections (Handsets)
2G Postpaid ARPU 413 413 413 413 413 413 413
2G Prepaid ARPU 67 67 67 67 67 67 67
3G ARPU 105 105 105 105 105 105 105
ARPU Projections (Broadband)
3G Broadband ARPU 593 593 593 593 593 593 593
ARPU Projections (Blended)
3G Blended ARPU (Handsets + Modems) 212 212 212 212 212 212 212
Revenue from 3G (Mn)
Total Revenue 3G 2074269 2074269 2074269 2074269 2074269 2074269 2074269
Revenue Split (Mobile Service Provider)
Voice Revenue (Mn) 599372 599372 599372 599372 599372 599372 599372
Mobile Data Revenue (Mn) 129864 129864 129864 129864 129864 129864 129864
Broadband Revenue (Mn) 828819 828819 828819 828819 828819 828819 828819
Total Data Revenue (Mn) 958683 958683 958683 958683 958683 958683 958683
Gross Revenue (Mn) 1558055 1558055 1558055 1558055 1558055 1558055 1558055
Net Interconnection Charges 311,611 311,611 311,611 311,611 311,611 311,611 311,611
Net Revenue 1246444 1246444 1246444 1246444 1246444 1246444 1246444
EBITDA (Mn) 722937 722937 722937 722937 722937 722937 722937
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization 71813 71813 0 0 0 0 0
EBIT (Mn) 602651 602651 674464 674464 674464 674464 674464
Tax @ 30% 180795 180795 202339 202339 202339 202339 202339
Net Income (Mn) 421856 421856 472125 472125 472125 472125 472125
Add
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization 71813 71813 0 0 0 0 0
Free Cash Flow (Mn) 542142 542142 520598 520598 520598 520598 520598
NPV (Bn)
IRR
Debt Schedule
Debt Remaining 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595 538595
Interest 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474 48474
Depreciation + Amortization Schedule
Years
Asset Remaining 71813 0 0 0 0 0 0
Depreciaiton 71813 71813 0 0 0 0 0
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9.2 DCF Assumptions 
 
Figure 39 – DCF Assumptions (2011 – 2016) 
Assumptions
Year 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Population Gowth Rate 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
Wireless Subscribers Growth Rate 11.20% 11.20% 11.20% 11.20% 11.20% 4.0%
3G Penetration 0.01% 0.1% 0.8% 2.1% 4.7% 8.3%
Growth of 3G Subscribers NA 915% 712% 166% 127% 79%
Proportion of 3G Mobile Services out of Total 3G Subs 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78%
Proportion of 3G Modems out of Total 3G Subs 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Proportion of Postpaid in 3G Mobile 100% 90% 50% 40% 25% 20%
Proportion of Prepaid in 3G Mobile 0.00% 10.0% 50.0% 60.0% 75.00% 80.0%
Growth of 2G ARPU (Postpaid) -5.00% -4.00% -3% -2% -1% 0
Growth of 2G ARPU (Prepaid) -20.00% -10.00% -5% -2.50% -1% 0
Premium of 3G over 2G (15 - 35%) 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Delcine in 3G Broadband ARPU -1.50% -1.50% -1.50% -1.50% -1.50% -1.50%
Share of VAS in 3G Mobile ARPU 11% 14% 16% 19% 21% 24%
Share of Operator ARPU in 3G Mobile Data ARPU 72.50% 71.00% 69.50% 68.00% 66.50% 65.00%
Net Interconnection Charges as % of Gross Revenues 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Expenses as % of Net Revenue
Network Operating Expenses 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Sales & Distribution Expenses 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
IT Expenses 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Service Expenses 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Billing, Collection and Bad Debt 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Marketing Expenses 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Personnel Administration 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Total Operating Expenses 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37%
Spectrum Usage Charge as % of AGR 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
EBITDA as % of Net Revenue 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58%
EBITDA as % of Gross Revenue 46% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46%
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Figure 40 – DCF Assumptions (2017 – 2023) 
 
Assumptions
Year 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023
Population Gowth Rate 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
Wireless Subscribers Growth Rate 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 4.0% 1.50% 1.50%
3G Penetration 12.3% 18% 27% 40% 59% 58% 57%
Growth of 3G Subscribers 50% 50% 50% 50% 50% 0.00% 0.00%
Proportion of 3G Mobile Services out of Total 3G Subs 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78%
Proportion of 3G Modems out of Total 3G Subs 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Proportion of Postpaid in 3G Mobile 10% 8.75% 7.50% 6.25% 5% 5% 5%
Proportion of Prepaid in 3G Mobile 90% 91% 93% 94% 95% 95% 95%
Growth of 2G ARPU (Postpaid) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Growth of 2G ARPU (Prepaid) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Premium of 3G over 2G (15 - 35%) 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Delcine in 3G Broadband ARPU -1.50% -1.50% -1.50% -1.50% -1.50% 0% 0%
Share of VAS in 3G Mobile ARPU 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Share of Operator ARPU in 3G Mobile Data ARPU 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%
Net Interconnection Charges as % of Gross Revenues 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Expenses as % of Net Revenue
Network Operating Expenses 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Sales & Distribution Expenses 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
IT Expenses 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Service Expenses 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Billing, Collection and Bad Debt 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Marketing Expenses 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Personnel Administration 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Total Operating Expenses 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37%
Spectrum Usage Charge as % of AGR 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
EBITDA as % of Net Revenue 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58%
EBITDA as % of Gross Revenue 46% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46%
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Figure 41 – DCF Assumptions (2024 – 2030) 
   
Assumptions
Year 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030
Population Gowth Rate 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
Wireless Subscribers Growth Rate 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50% 1.50%
3G Penetration 56% 55% 54% 54% 53% 52% 51%
Growth of 3G Subscribers 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
Proportion of 3G Mobile Services out of Total 3G Subs 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78% 78%
Proportion of 3G Modems out of Total 3G Subs 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22% 22%
Proportion of Postpaid in 3G Mobile 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Proportion of Prepaid in 3G Mobile 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95% 95%
Growth of 2G ARPU (Postpaid) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Growth of 2G ARPU (Prepaid) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Premium of 3G over 2G (15 - 35%) 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Delcine in 3G Broadband ARPU 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Share of VAS in 3G Mobile ARPU 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25% 25%
Share of Operator ARPU in 3G Mobile Data ARPU 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65% 65%
Net Interconnection Charges as % of Gross Revenues 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20% 20%
Expenses as % of Net Revenue
Network Operating Expenses 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15% 15%
Sales & Distribution Expenses 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7% 7%
IT Expenses 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Service Expenses 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Billing, Collection and Bad Debt 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2% 2%
Marketing Expenses 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3% 3%
Personnel Administration 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Total Operating Expenses 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37% 37%
Spectrum Usage Charge as % of AGR 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
EBITDA as % of Net Revenue 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58% 58%
EBITDA as % of Gross Revenue 46% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46% 46%
